Abstract
The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of benefits to coordinated activities has been studied extensively. Basic to the concept of the core is the idea of group rationality as embodied by the blocking condition. The predictions given by the core may run into difficulties if some individuals or coalitions may benefit from not blocking “truthfully”. This paper investigates this question in games in some games that generalize assignment games. Some positive results are given, and relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aumann, R., Dreze, J.: Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures. International Journal of Game Theory 3, 217–237 (1974)
Bikhchandani, S., Ostroy, J.: The Package Assignment Model. Journal of Economic Theory 107, 377–406 (2002)
Demange, G.: Strategyproofness in the assignment Market Game, Working paper, Laboratoire d’Economtrie de l’Ecole Polytechnique (1982)
Demange, G., Gale, D.: The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets. Econometrica 53, 873–888 (1985)
Demange, G.: Nonmanipulable Cores. Econometrica 55, 1057–1074 (1987)
Demange, G.: Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures. Journal of Mathematical Economics 23, 45–58 (1994)
Demange, G.: The strategy structure of some coalition formation games, mimeo
Kaneko, M., Wooders, M.: Cores of Partitioning Games. Mathematical Social Sciences 3, 313–327 (1982)
Kelso, A.S., Crawford, V.P.: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes. Econometrica 50, 1483–1504 (1982)
Leonard, H.B.: Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions. Journal of Political Economy 91, 461–479 (1983)
Scarf, H.E.: The core of an n-person game. Econometrica 35, 50–69 (1967)
Shapley, L.S.: On Balanced Sets and Cores. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14, 453–460 (1967)
Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M.: The assignment game I: the core. Int. J. Game Theory 1, 111–130 (1971)
Vickrey, W.: Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16, 8–37 (1961)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Demange, G. (2005). Incentives in Some Coalition Formation Games. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_25
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_25
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)