Abstract
We come up with a special attack strategy to the quantum key distribution protocol based on quantum encryption. With our strategy an eavesdropper can elicit about half of the key bits without being detected by the legal communication parties. Furthermore, the eavesdropping needs only facilities similar to that of the legal parties. Therefore, we draw a conclusion that the original protocol is insecure and, at last, a feasible improvement of the protocol is proposed.
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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gao, F., Qin, SJ., Wen, QY., Zhu, FC. (2005). An Effective Attack on the Quantum Key Distribution Protocol Based on Quantum Encryption. In: Feng, D., Lin, D., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. CISC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3822. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11599548_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11599548_26
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30855-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32424-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)