Abstract
So I’m talking about protocol verification yet again. There are two formal analyses of Yahalom, one of them is a BAN analysis from the original paper and the other one, of course, is mine. Now there are some reactions to this sort of work that I want to dispose of even before I get away from my title slide. The first is, it was all very well doing a couple of protocols but when is it going to stop? And the point I want to make is that some protocols are different from others in a significant way, and that just because this may be the n-th protocol we can still learn things from it. This particular protocol, although very simple, has features which, I think, cause problems with many other methods of protocol analysis. It’s really quite a subtle protocol.
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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Paulson, L.C. (2000). The Yahalom Protocol. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1796. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10720107_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10720107_11
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