Abstract
In this paper, the fixed-payment distribution mode of Agile Virtual Enterprises (AVEs) is studied based on game theory, and the result is compared with that of the share income mode. Finally, the paper proposes that the goal function of the game is changed thus promotes the Nash equilibrium effort level approaches or equals to the Pareto equilibrium effort level.
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References
J. Chen, Agile Virtual Enterprises Appropriate for the Changed Characteristics of the Knowledge Economy Age, Industry Engineering 1 (2001).
T. Li, Research on the Game of the Formation and Conflict of Enterprises Group with Different Interests, Master’s Thesis of Xi’an Jiao Tong University, 1999, pp. 65–68.
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© 2006 International Federation for Information Processing
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Li, J., Liu, R., Chen, J. (2006). Study on the Game of Payment Distribution Mode about AVEs. In: Tjoa, A.M., Xu, L., Chaudhry, S.S. (eds) Research and Practical Issues of Enterprise Information Systems. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol 205. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34456-X_81
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34456-X_81
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-34345-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-34456-0
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