Abstract
Anonymous communication has become a building block of network services. Besides providing anonymity, speed (and thus real-time guarantees) are becoming crucial as well. In this paper we will introduce the global delaying adversary (GDA), an active attacker who is capable of arbitrarily delaying messages, while eavesdropping on all communication channels. This type of foe is particularly relevant for inter-mix relationships, where communication between the partners is secured (by authentication and integrity protection), and delaying remains the only effective external active attacking possibility. To counter GDA, the adaptive semi-real-time APROB Channel will be introduced. It will be shown that the APROB Channel can provide a guaranteed level of anonymity under semi-real-time1 conditions considering that the adversary cannot obtain any additional information by delaying messages, thus this type of attack will not be reasonable.
Naturally, against an adversary who can arbitrarily delay messages, no hard real-time guarantee can be given. The notion semi-real-time refers to the property that enables the channel to deliver the messages with the real-time requirements, if the adversary does not delay them.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Tóth, G., Hornák, Z.: Measuring anonymity in a non-adaptive, real-time system. In: Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET2004). Springer-Verlag, LNCS, Forthcoming (2004)
Pfitzmann, A., Köhntopp, M.: Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudonymity — a proposal for terminology. In Federrath, H., ed.: Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Volume 2009 of Springer-Verlag, LNCS., Berkeley, CA (2001) 1–9
Tóth, G., Hornák, Z., Vajda, F.: Measuring anonymity revisited. In Liimatainen, S., Virtanen, T., eds.: Proceedings of the Ninth Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems, Espoo, Finland (2004) 85–90
Serjantov, A., Danezis, G.: Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity. In Syver-son, P., Dingledine, R., eds.: Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET2002). Volume 2482 of Springer-Verlag, LNCS., San Francisco, CA (2002)
Díaz, C., Seys, S., Claessens, J., Preneel, B.: Towards measuring anonymity. In Syverson, P., Dingledine, R., eds.: Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET2002). Volume 2482 of Springer-Verlag, LNCS., San Francisco, CA (2002) 54–68
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., Syverson, P.: Tor: The second-generation onion router. In: Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium. (2004)
Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 4 (1981) 84–88
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 International Federation for Information Processing
About this paper
Cite this paper
Tóth, G., Hornák, Z. (2006). The APROB Channel: Adaptive Semi-Real-Time Anonymous Communication. In: Fischer-Hübner, S., Rannenberg, K., Yngström, L., Lindskog, S. (eds) Security and Privacy in Dynamic Environments. SEC 2006. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol 201. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-33406-8_45
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-33406-8_45
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-33405-9
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-33406-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)