Abstract
In these days, the global legitimacy of the WTO is frequently being called into question by “civil society”, and particularly by the NGOs. One of the chief criticisms is that the WTO’s decisions, and especially those taken within the dispute settlement context, are arrived at “behind closed doors” and take into account only the trade-offs between State interests, with no consideration for the rights and interests of private individuals. To make up for these shortcomings, the NGOs and various private bodies, including those that represent the multinationals, are demanding, among other things, the right to join the proceedings as “friends of the court” and, in that capacity, to submit amicus curiae briefs.
I would like to thank Gabrielle Marceau of the WTO and Arthur E. Appleton, attorney in Geneva, for having kindly read through and commented on this contribution, as well as for the always very stimulating discussions I have had with them. I also would like to thank Zasova Svetlana for editing work on this chapter.
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References
For a general approach to the question of the role of the NGOs and amicus curiae, see Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Proceedings, 88 American Journal of International Law 611–619 (1994); Raymond Ranjeva, Les organisations non-gouvernementales et la mise en oeuvre du droit international, 270 Recueil Des Cours de l’académie de Droit International 9–106 (1997); Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 897–929 (2001); Philippe Sands, Le droit international, le praticien et les acteurs non étatiques, in L’émergence de la société Civile Internationale—Vers la Privatisation du Droit International, (Pedone 2003).
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (1998), ¶ 101 (emphasis in original).
Report of the WTO Panel, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (1999), ¶ ¶ 7.72 and 7.73.
United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 129.
With regard to the diversification of the actors in international relations, see Brigitte Stern, Etats et souverainet é: la souveraineté de l’Etat face à la mondialisation, in Universite de Tous Les Savoirs: Qu’est-Ce Que la Societe? 828–839 (Odile Jacob ed., 2000).
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 108.
Id. ¶ 110.
Id. ¶ 104 (emphasis in original).
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 109.
Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law 477, 485 (1999).
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 83.
Id. ¶ 86.
Id. ¶ 89.
See Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 487.
As Hélène Ruiz Fabri has pointed out, “the Appellate Body’s final position amounts to neutralizing the problem...As with the composition of delegations (in the Bananas case), the government barrier may be regarded as having been maintained”, in Chronique du règlement des différends. 1996–1998, 2 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 497 (1999).
Gregory Schaffer, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, 93 American Journal of International Law 510 (1999).
James Cameron and Karen Campbell, Dispute Resolution in The World Trade Organization 227 (1998).
See Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 494.
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Carbon Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, (“United States—Lead and Bismuth II”) WT/DS138/AB/R (2000), ¶ 39.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 42.
Report of the Appellate Body, U.S.—Carbon Steel, supra note 25, ¶ 42.
On this case see, in particular, Geert A. Zonnenkeyn, The Appellate Body’s Communication on Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Asbestos Case, 35 Journal of World Trade 553 (2001).
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC-Asbestos”) WT/DS135/AB/R (2001), ¶ 50.
Requirements undoubtedly closely modeled on those suggested by Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell in their article entitled Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 Journal of International Economic Law 155 (2001).
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines (“EC—Sardines”), WT/DS231/AB/R (2002), ¶ 161.
Id. ¶ 155.
Id. ¶ 65.
Id. ¶ 111.
Id. ¶ 157.
Id. ¶ 162, citing United States—Lead and Bismuth II supra note 25, ¶ 39 n.58.
EC—Sardines, supra note 36, ¶ 162 (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 166. (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 167.
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 106 (emphasis in original).
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Lead and Bismuth II, supra note 25, ¶ 36. Cf. the position of the European Communities in another case cited below, namely, United States—Section 110(5) of U.S. Copyright Act—Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R (2000), ¶ 6.5 (emphasis in original).
Report of the WTO Panel, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon—Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada, WT/DS18/RW (2000), ¶ 7.9.
See Report of the WTO Panel, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R (1999), ¶ 6.3.
Report of the WTO Panel, United States—Section 110 (5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (2000), ¶ 6.5.
Report of the WTO Panel, European Communities—Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India, WT/DS141/R (2000), ¶ 6.1 and n.10.
Report of the Panel, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (2000), ¶ 8.12.
EC-Asbestos, supra note 32, ¶ 56.
Report of the Appellate Body, Thailand—Anti-Dumping Duties on—Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R (2001).
Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 72.
Id. ¶ 74.
Id. ¶¶ 76 and 78.
To that should be added the possibility, if not of collusion, at least of a conflict of interest between an NGO and a member of a panel or the Appellate Body. It is worth recalling the withdrawal of an English law lord from the Pinochet case, because of his links with Amnesty International which had been authorized to submit an amicus curiae brief. This led to a second hearing before the House of Lords. House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division); Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division), Judgment of March 24, 1999, 38 ILM 581–663 (1999).
See Ascensio, supra Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (2001) note 1, at 918–919.
Meeting of November 6, 1998, WT/DSB/M/50, December 14, 1998.
Id. at 2, 3 and 4 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Id. at 7 and 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
Id. at 16–17 (emphasis added).
DSB meeting held on June 7, 2000, WT/DSB/M/83, June 7, 2000.
Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis added). In addition, “Brazil noted that the question of who could be heard by panels and the Appellate Body was not a ‘procedural rule’, but rather a very substantive component of the DSU rules, which affected the way the system operated and significantly altered the rights and obligations Members negotiated under the Uruguay Round”, WT/GC/M/60 ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added).
WT/DSB/M/92, January 15, 2001.
Id. ¶ 128.
See Report of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, January 23, 2002.
Factual Background Note Relating to the Issue Raised by Certain Members, Circulated in Job(00)/7343 and reference in Report of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, January 23, 2002.
Report of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, January 23, 2002, ¶ 74.
Comment by Egypt on behalf of the informal group of developing countries at the meeting of the General Council on November 22, 2000, WT/GC/M/60,¶ 18.
See Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 487–488; and EC—Sardines, supra note 36, ¶¶ 153–170, where the Appellate Body received an amicus submission from the Kingdom of Morocco.
As noted, for example, by Asif Qureshi, Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGO’s and the WTO Appellate Body,48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 205 (January 1999): “... The NGOs do not need to prove the veracity of their statements. The onus of rebuttal falls on the parties in question. Indeed, conceivably, NGO submissions could have the effect of shifting, or at any rate partly distorting, the onus of proof as set out in the Understanding.”
Report of the Appellate Body, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R (1999), ¶ 129.
Id. ¶ 130.
Georg C. Umbricht, An “Amicus Curiae Brief” on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO, 4 Journal of International Economic Law 779 (2001).
Ascensio, supra Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (2001) note 1, at 900.
See e.g., Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell, Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 Journal of International Economic Law 164–175 (2001).
See e.g., Bertrand Badie et Marie-Claude Smouts, Le Retournement du Monde: Sociologie de la Scene Internationale (1995).
Umbricht, supra Georg C. Umbricht, An “Amicus Curiae Brief” on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001) note 104, at 785–786.
WT/GC/M/60 ¶ 21. Cf. the similar comments of Pakistan: “[w]ith regard to the manner in which this communication had been sent, i.e., to NGOs on the WTO e-mailing list, there was clearly an inherent discrimination since the largest number of NGOs from developing countries did not have access to the internet and were not on the WTO e-mailing list”. Georg C. Umbricht, An “Amicus Curiae Brief” on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001) Id. ¶ 66.
DSB meeting of June 7, 2000, WT/DSB/M/83, July 7, 2000 ¶ 8.
Ascensio, supra Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (2001) note 1, at 898.
Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell, supra Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell, Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001) note 106, at 164.
See, in particular, the NAFTA arbitration in an international investment case involving a government and an investor, Methanex Corporation v. United States, Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae”, January 15, 2001, http://www.naftalaw.org or http://www.international-economic-law.org.See also another NAFTA arbitration along the same lines, United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Canada, October 17, 2001. On this question, see Brigitte Stern, L’entrée de la societe civile dans l’arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur, 2 Revue de l’arbitrage 329 (2002).
Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 494.
Arthur E. Appleton, Amicus Curiae Submissions in the Carbon Steel Case: Another Rabbit from the Appellate Body’s Hat?, 3 Journal of International Economic Law 691, 699 (2000).
Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 477. One commentator has written that “Amicus briefs from nongovernmental organizations could further enhance the legitimacy, and acceptance, of the WTO dispute settlement process”. See Thomas Cottier, The WTO and Environmental Law: Three Points for Discussion, in Trade and Environment: Bridging the Gap 59 (James Cameron and Agata Fijalkowski eds. 1998).
Ian Brownlie, The Individual Before Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdiction, 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 719 (1962). See also, Shabtaï Rosenne, Reflections on the Position of the Individual in Inter-State Litigation in the International Court of Justice, in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke 250 (Philippe Sanders eds. 1967).
See EC—Asbestos, supra note 32.
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Stern, B. (2005). The Intervention of Private Entities and States as “Friends of the Court” in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings. In: Macrory, P.F.J., Appleton, A.E., Plummer, M.G. (eds) The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-22688-5_32
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