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An Interpretative History of the Uruguay Round Negotiation

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The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis

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Abstract

The Uruguay Round negotiation was the eighth postwar multilateral trade negotiation conducted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). As with other GATT negotiations, its purpose was to liberalize trade. One might have expected the Uruguay Round, as with other GATT negotiations, to continue the steady movement toward a more open and predictable international trade regime. It did not do this. Instead, the Uruguay Round produced a profound alteration of the trade regime in response to an equally profound transformation of international economic relations. It amounted to system change in the world economy.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dalhousie University, Canada

    Gilbert R. Winham (Professor Emeritus of Government and Political Science)

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  1. Gilbert R. Winham
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. International Trade Law Center, International Law Institute, Washington, D.C.

    Patrick F. J. Macrory (Director) (Director)

  2. White & Case, Geneva

    Arthur E. Appleton (Counsel) (Counsel)

  3. SAIS-Bologna, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna

    Michael G. Plummer (Professor of International Economics) (Professor of International Economics)

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Winham, G.R. (2005). An Interpretative History of the Uruguay Round Negotiation. In: Macrory, P.F.J., Appleton, A.E., Plummer, M.G. (eds) The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-22688-5_1

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