Abstract
Transaction cost economics (TCE) has positioned itself in the center of the economics of organization. From Williamson (1975) onwards TCE has made important progress both in conceptualization and in empirical testing (see Groenewegen and Vromen in this volume). The position of TCE at this moment is outlined in the contribution of Williamson in this volume. The key concepts are of a technical (asset specificity), of a human (bounded rationality) and a behavioral nature (opportunism). The general strategy out of which TCE works can be summarized as follows: After having characterized the transaction, the potential governance structures are discussed in terms of transaction cost minimizing capabilities. The match of transactions with governance structures is formulated in reduced form hypotheses to be confirmed in empirical research.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Dow, G.K. 1987. “The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 8(1), March, 13–38.
Williamson, O.E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Groenewegen, J. (1996). Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Why and How?. In: Groenewegen, J. (eds) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 48. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1800-9_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-7302-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-1800-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive