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Analysis and Improvements of the DPA Contest v4 Implementation

  • Conference paper
Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering (SPACE 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8804))

Abstract

DPA Contest is an international framework which allows researchers to compare their attacks under a common setting. The latest version of DPA Contest proposes a software implementation of AES-256 protected with a low-entropy masking scheme. The masking scheme is called Rotating Sbox Masking (RSM) which claims first-degree security. In this paper, we review the attacks submitted against DPA Contest v4 implementation to identify the common loop holes in the proposed implementation. Next we propose some ideas to improve the existing implementation to resist most of the proposed attacks at affordable performance overhead. Finally we compare our implementation with the original proposal in terms of complexity and side-channel leakage.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. TELECOM-ParisTech, Crypto Group, Paris, France

    Shivam Bhasin, Nicolas Bruneau, Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley & Zakaria Najm

  2. AST division, Rousset, France

    Nicolas Bruneau

  3. Secure-IC S.A.S., Rennes, France

    Jean-Luc Danger & Sylvain Guilley

Authors
  1. Shivam Bhasin
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  2. Nicolas Bruneau
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  3. Jean-Luc Danger
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  4. Sylvain Guilley
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  5. Zakaria Najm
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India

    Rajat Subhra Chakraborty

  2. Department of Computer Systems and Communications, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

    Vashek Matyas

  3. The Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech., 24060, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    Patrick Schaumont

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Bhasin, S., Bruneau, N., Danger, JL., Guilley, S., Najm, Z. (2014). Analysis and Improvements of the DPA Contest v4 Implementation. In: Chakraborty, R.S., Matyas, V., Schaumont, P. (eds) Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. SPACE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8804. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12060-7_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12060-7_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12059-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12060-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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