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Notes
On the distinction between synthetic and artifactual organisms, see (Holm 2012, pp. 15–20).
The following citations are for Holm and not Varner. I agree with the interpretation given, but I am also interested in what to say about such criticisms independent of whether Varner should be understood this way.
The relevant aetiology that grounds teleology in artifacts is a selection process. However, the selection process is very different than that involved in natural selection. There need not be any of the classical ingredients of natural selection (phenotypic variation, heritability of variation, and difference in fitness (Lewontin 1970)) or, as Godfrey-Smith (2009) puts it, a “Darwinian Population”. Selection processes for artifacts are not well developed. Clearly, they involve intentions on the part of the designer/user (though this is not sufficient), and certain actions of the designer/user (also not sufficient). They must also allow that designers can generate teleology by setting up artificial selection processes that mimic natural selection as we sometimes do with artificial breeding or computer simulations. An adequate aetiological account of artifact function must tell us how intention and action combine to generate functions or teleology while making sense of myriad distinctions (such as that between “the function of” and “functioning as”). Thanks to Russell Powell for pressing me to elaborate these points.
There are various theoretical reasons for preferring the aetiological account to rival accounts with respect to grounding claims of teleology or interests. Several such reasons are discussed by Holm (2012 pp. 9–14).
This is not to deny that there may be reasons only to care about the interests of organisms or that there may be good reasons for discounting the interests of artifacts.
Holm seems to agree on this point, since he is concerned that his account applies to non-organisms as well as organisms (Holm 2012, pp.28–29).
Such organisms were made famous by discussions of SwampMan introduced by Davidson (Davidson 1987).
One complication here is Dretske’s (1995) claim that selection is necessary for a cognitive system to be representational.
“Frustrate” is not to be understood in a psychological sense.
For example, Holm says that we might be forced to understand hurricanes and candle flames as having interests in the same sense that organisms do (Holm 2012, p. 28). While candle flames might be understood as artifacts, I take it that (naturally occurring) hurricanes are a paradigm example of something that has neither function nor teleological organization.
References
Davidson, D. (1987). Knowing one’s own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Darwinian populations and natural selection. USA: Oxford University Press.
Holm, S. (2012). Biological interests, normative functions, and synthetic biology. Philosophy and Technology (in press)
Lewontin, R. (1970). The units of selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 1, 1–18.
Neander, K. (1991). Functions as selected effects: the conceptual analyst’s defense. Philosophy of Science, 58(2), 168–184.
Varner, G. (1998). In Nature’s Interest. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Basl, J. Nothing Good Will Come from Giving Up on Aetiological Accounts of Teleology. Philos. Technol. 25, 543–546 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-012-0079-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-012-0079-2