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LIS and BCIs: a Local, Pluralist, and Pragmatist Approach to 4E Cognition

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Abstract

Four previous papers in this journal have discussed the role of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) in the lives of Locked-In Syndrome (LIS) patients in terms of the four “E” frameworks for cognition – extended, embedded, embodied, and enactive (also called enacted) cognition. This paper argues that in the light of more recent literature on these 4E frameworks, none of the four papers has taken quite the right approach to deciding which, if any, of the E frameworks is the best one for the job. More specifically, I argue for an approach that is pragmatist rather than purely metaphysical, pluralist rather than monist, and perhaps most importantly, local to particular research programmes, rather than about BCIs in general. The paper will outline this approach, then illustrate it with reference to a particular research programme which tackles the issue of BCI communication for patients in Complete Locked-In Syndrome (CLIS).

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Notes

  1. For the “4E” terminology, see for example the Phenomenology of Cognitive Science special issue [5].

  2. I intend this distinction as part of the explanation of what I mean by “pragmatist”. I do not intend to assume a particular account of metaphysics.

  3. It might be that these two things cannot truly be separated. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

  4. Here I will follow much of the post-Clark-and-Chalmers literature, and papers subsequent to Fenton and Alpert’s in this journal, in referring to extended cognition rather than extended mind (see especially p.65, note 9 [2]). Fenton and Alpert use the terms “mind” and “cognition” apparently interchangeably in their paper, although they only speak of mind with the prefix “extended”. I take it, as Walter does, that not much turns on this issue here.

  5. Kyselo and Di Paulo actually defend a particular kind of enactivism (what might be called the “autopoietic enactivism” of Fransisco Varela, Evan Thompson, etc. [18, 19]). They argue that it is superior to both extended cognition, and also the sensorimotor approach of Alva Noë, which is usually construed as another variety of enactivism. I will return to sensorimotor enactivism in my case study sketch.

  6. Although these ideas were present in the literature from the start, they have moved centre-stage (p.190, pp.204–205) [22].

  7. Compare the debate between Clark and Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa concerning the kinds of functions that can be the objects of fruitful scientific investigation [24], (pp.93–96) [12]. As Clark says here, ‘It is, above all else, a matter of empirical discovery, not armchair speculation, whether there can be a fully fledged science of the extended mind’ (p.96) [12].

  8. Although this is not to say that they cannot overlap – they are compatible in some respects and incompatible in others. As they continue to develop, it might be that some of the approaches are amalgamated into a single approach. This possibility does not speak against the kind of openness to pluralism I recommend.

  9. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation.

  10. I set aside here issues of how such a pluralist science could work in practice, but for some suggestions see [25, 26].

  11. There is no citation of Sherwin in Clark 2008, so it seems the reference to lenses is not (or at least not directly) from the same source.

  12. Because we are looking at particular cases of research rather than generalising to concept-use in a subdiscipline like Stotz et al. are doing, we have no need of experimental philosophy, but can instead look closely at the research in question, treating it as a case study, and examining it to see what implicit concepts of cognition are in play. I have given a more thorough defence of the case study approach as opposed to the experimental in [27].

  13. I am here following in particular Shapere’s “Rejection of Anticipations of Nature” [31], but claims that we cannot know what kind of approach will work in advance of doing the science can be found in the extended cognition literature [32, 33].

  14. This result is the opposite of that found by Piccoione et al., who did find a decline in performance as physical impairment increased [34].

  15. It is worth noting that this test was not the main aim of their paper, and a full analysis of their concepts would involve looking more closely at how this test fits with their main aim.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, School of European Culture and Languages, Cornwallis North West, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NF, UK

    Ruth Hibbert

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Hibbert, R. LIS and BCIs: a Local, Pluralist, and Pragmatist Approach to 4E Cognition. Neuroethics 9, 187–198 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9267-6

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