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Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel

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Abstract

Antitrust enforcement efforts in the United States and abroad have been ramped up in high-tech industries, which has rekindled older and largely unresolved debates concerning the appropriate role of antitrust enforcement in high-tech markets. This paper evaluates the likely competitive effects of Intel’s conduct through two approaches: The conventional approach focuses on traditional antitrust metrics in product markets: prices and output. The second, alternative approach involves turning to financial markets for valuable information. Under either approach, the available data do not support the theory that Intel’s behavior harmed consumers.

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Correspondence to Joshua D. Wright.

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I thank Patricia Grant for excellent research assistance and Samantha Zyontz for valuable comments on an earlier draft.

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Wright, J.D. Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel. Rev Ind Organ 38, 387–404 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9297-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9297-5

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