Abstract
Buchanan’s last book declares an antipathy to one aspect of “conservatism” as he identified it—namely, conservatism’s defense of hierarchy in social relations. Buchanan’s anti-hierarchy stance owes something to the rural populist background of his early years. That stance also explains something about his professional and individual personality: his contentment to remain at non-elitist institutions; his preparedness to challenge establishment thinking on the nature and role of government; his antagonism to inherited wealth and the privileges of dynasty; and his life-long affection for elements of the simple rural life. The aim of this short piece is to highlight these various connections between Buchanan’s political commitments and the content and conduct of his work.
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Notes
Buchanan’s meticulousness in settling on an appropriate title for his various “efforts” was notable: it was not a matter he took lightly. As the catalogue indicates, he had a penchant for alliteration (The Calculus of Consent, The Limits of Liberty, The Reason of Rules) and would often spend several weeks trying out alternatives in order to settle on a title that satisfied him.
Bill Niskanen (2006) offers exactly the same judgment in his Cato review of the book.
See for example Brennan and Hamlin (2004).
All quotations unless otherwise indicated, and the page references attached, are taken from Buchanan (2005).
See Brennan (2000).
See, for example, Buchanan and Yoon (1994).
There was little of the attitude of deference to established nostrums or for that matter established institutions (like simple majority rule), which characterizes much “conservative” political doctrine.
In a not atypical reaction, Mark Kelman (1988) referred to public choice theory as “democracy-bashing”.
Exactly how far this was deliberate is perhaps debatable. He observed on one occasion that he hadn’t exactly been pressed with offers from the Harvards and Princetons of this world. But he never cultivated such offers either—nor seemed in the least impressed when others got them.
He once extolled to me the virtues of Andy Whinston, precisely in such terms.
The general argument is developed in Brennan & Pettit (2004).
References
Brennan, G. (2000). Onwards and upwards. Public Choice, 104, 1–18.
Brennan, G., & Hamlin, A. (2004). Analytic conservatism. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 675–691.
Brennan, G., & Pettit, P. (2004). The economy of esteem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buchanan, J. (2005). Why I, too, am not a conservative. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Buchanan, J., & Yoon, Y. (1994). The return to increasing returns. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hayek, F. (1960). The constitution of liberty. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Kelman, M. (1988). On democracy-bashing. Virginia Law Review, 74, 199–273.
Niskanen, W. (2006). Why I, too, am not a conservative: A review. Cato Journal, 11, 612–614.
Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, P. (2001). A theory of freedom. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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The original version of this paper was written for presentation at the 2013 Public Choice Society Meetings in New Orleans.
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Brennan, G. Buchanan’s anti-conservatism. Public Choice 163, 7–13 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0223-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0223-x