Abstract
This paper proposes a formal model of the market for political news. Under reasonable market conditions and when the audience has psychological biases, it may be profitable for outlets to differentiate their coverage. Moreover, the implications of the model speak to a deeper impact of political polarization of the electorate.
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Gasper, J.T. Reporting for sale: the market for news coverage. Public Choice 141, 493–508 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9466-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9466-3