Abstract
In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into this process of deliberation, he has not, contra Steglich-Petersen, already adopted the truth aim with regard to p. In closing, we further suggest that proponents of the truth aim hypothesis need to focus on aim-guidance, not mere aim attribution, for their approach to have explanatory utility so underlining the significance of Owens’ argument.
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Notes
Authors are listed in reverse alphabetical order. Why not? Possessors of names towards the end of the alphabet unite! We would like to thank the AHRC for funding a Doctoral Studentship (for Ema Sullivan-Bissett) and the Leverhulme Trust for funding a Major Leverhulme Research Fellowship (for Paul Noordhof) which supported the research of which this is a part; members of the Mind and Reason group, Keith Allen, Will McNeill and Rachael Wiseman who provided useful feedback on the presentation of these ideas, David Owens for his encouragement at a crucial stage, and Tom Stoneham for his feedback on the material as part of the postgraduate monitoring process in York.
References
Owens, D. J. (2003). Does belief have an aim? Philosophical Studies, 115, 283–305.
Steglich-Petersen, A. (2009). Weighing the aim of belief. Philosophical Studies, 145, 395–405.