Abstract
Molyneux’s question famously asks about whether a newly sighted subject might immediately recognize, by sight alone, shapes that were already familiar to her from a tactile point of view. This paper addresses three crucial points concerning this puzzle. First, (a) the presence of two different questions: the classic one concerning visual recognition and another one concerning vision-for-action (the second question has been almost completely neglected in the literature and even those who mention this second formulation do not fully investigate it). Second, (b) the explicit distinction, reported in the literature, between ocular and cortical blindness. Third, (c) the importance of making reference to our best neuroscientific account on vision, ‘the two visual systems model’, in order to better address Molyneux’s problem(s). Then, by offering a new, deeper analysis of the relation between (a), (b) and (c), this paper suggests that the subjects of Molyneux’s two different questions show the same visual impairment as brain-damaged subjects with different lesions of the visual cortex. In particular, the subject of the first (classic) question shows the same impairment in visual recognition as a visual agnosic subject, while the subject of the second question shows the same visual impairment in visuomotor processing as an optic ataxic subject. These impairments still hold even if ocular processing is restored. Therefore, I suggest the following. For the first classic question, the required experimental setting cannot be properly reached. By contrast, concerning the second question, based on the interpretation we select, either the answer is negative, or, as with the first question, the experimental setting cannot be properly reached. This proposal constitutes, with the other approaches offered in the literature, a further attempt to tackle the enormous complexity of Molyneux’s puzzle.
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Notes
In this paper, I do not consider the case of restoration through prosthetic devices and devices for sensory substitution (see Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 219).
On the same point see (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 269). A brief historical note is crucial here. While most refer to Locke’s published version of the problem (Locke 1694), which only includes the shape identification problem, the letter by Molyneux, of July 1688 (the year of Locke’s 1688 masterpiece), mentions the problem concerning reaching: “Let us suppose his Sight Restored to him; Whether he Could by his sight, and before he touched them, know which is the Globe and which the Cube? Or whether he Could know by his sight, before the stretched out his Hand, whether he could not Reach them, to they were Remouved 20 or 1000 ft from him?” (also reported in Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 256). I want to thank an anonymous referee, who suggested adding this very important note. Also, in order not to mischaracterize Molyneux’s (1688) second question, it is clear, from the quotation I added, that what Molyneux asked is about whether the newly sighted individual would know whether visually displayed objects were within reach. Of course, this question involves depth recognition, which, thus, may not require cognitive processing related to ‘planning and controlling action’. I want to thank another anonymous referee, who suggested specifying this point. That said, the reformulation proposed by Jacomuzzi et al. remains very interesting, and deserves to be studied in relation to the other one about shape identification.
The question included by Locke in relation to Molyneux’s response, and his analysis about the reasons for a negative answer, in later editions of his Essay, generated several variants and a very lively debate. Most of the effort, concerning early analysis of Molyneux’s puzzle(s) about what the newly sighted man born blind could, at first, do come from Berkeley, Reid, Diderot and Leibniz (see Occelli 2014; Degenaar and Lokhorst 2014; Degenaar 1996). For example, variants were about the perception of 2D shapes, rather than 3D, and about newborns instead of previously congenitally blind adults (see Glenney 2013: 546) and about space perception (Berkeley 1948:186; Cheselden 1728: 447–450). It is thanks to the famous cataract surgery by Cheselden (1728) that the variants about less than complete prior blindness started to be analyzed very carefully. I owe this specification to the important suggestion of an anonymous referee. Note also that someone has suggested that Molyneux’s puzzle “can be analyzed into a hierarchy of specific questions”, which offer different new variants (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 255). See also Glenney (2013) for a review of the different philosophical problems related to the “many lives of Molyneux’s question” (the expression is by Glenney, p. 541).
Of course, there are different degrees concerning the possible answers to MQA3. For example, one might argue that success could be possible with just some corrections and a large but less than huge online adaption. However, here I am only interested in successful action at first sight. Thus, I consider only the case in which the subject can, at first sight, and without perceptual indecision, automatically grasp the object. Hence, I am not interested in all the cases in which visuomotor success is not possible at first sight, but is reached with adaptation, regardless of whether it is huge or just large but less than a huge online adaptation. For this reason, I do not care about those possible degrees of visuomotor confidence that might be exhibited by Molyneux subject, and that are related to a possible answer to MQA3. The analysis of the different degrees related to MQA3 would go beyond the analysis of automatic visuomotor processing at first sight, which concerns MQA2 and which is precisely the question this paper is about. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to clarify what I pointed out in this footnote.
This is the reason why I avoid the question about whether the subject can succeed in MQA1. I assume that, while a positive answer to MQA3 is, in principle, possible, the heart of the issue is the possibility of a positive answer to MQA2.
For a complete review about the times of the different visual recoveries in relation to the possible impairments see (Ostrovsky et al. 2006; Lewis and Maurer 2005; Maurer et al. 2005; see the famous Project Prakash: Mandavilli 2006; Sinha and Held 2012; Thomas 2011; Sinha et al. 2014). See footnotes 12, 16.
See my p. 12.
See my p. 12.
One might argue that the distinction between ocular and cortical blindness is not exhaustive. For example, blindness might be due to the impairment of subcortical brain regions involved in visual processing (like, for example, the superior colliculus, which is involved in the processing of visual stimuli received from the retina). However, here I am trying to distinguish between blindness due to ocular malfunctioning and blindness given by the impairment of different brain structures. Here I focus on the visual cortex and its bifurcations, but the discourse might be extended to subcortical structures, as well as to other structures of the central nervous system that turn out to be crucially involved in vision. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to specify this important point.
Some might argue that damage to the ventral stream can, in some situations, impair grasping (Dijkerman et al. 2009; see also Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015; Ferretti 2016b, 2016c, Zipoli Caiani and Ferretti 2016). However, this is an impairment on action planning and impairment of action planning (computation of high-order motor aspects) does not lead to the impairment of action programming (computation of movement parameters in relation to visual information). This is because the former is computed by ventral processing, while the latter is courtesy of dorsal processing (Ibid.; for a related discussion, see Clark 2007: 577). While ventral processing is important for action (especially in healthy individuals) (Schenk and McIntosh 2010), it is usually involved in more delayed actions, compared with immediate, automatic actions dorsally processed (Cohen et al. 2009). This is because ventral processing can use memory stored information (Singhal et al. 2006, 2007, 2013), and semantic knowledge (Zipoli Caiani and Ferretti 2016). Furthermore, our visuomotor memory can be completely detached from the conscious visual content of object features (for a review see Heath et al. 2008). Thus, even if ventral processing might be involved in some aspects of action (Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015; Ferretti 2016a, 2016b; Zipoli Caiani and Ferretti 2016), in the way proposed, nonetheless, this contribution does not challenge the way the dichotomy is settled, concerning the main functions of the streams, especially concerning the situations of visual impairments. Accordingly, even those who recognize a minimal ventral contribution for action (Clark 2007: 577) endorse the strong difference between visual agnosic and optic ataxic patients in terms of visual resources as well as concerning the different specialization, with regards visual recognition and vision for action, of the two streams (Ibid.: 568–569); see footnote 18 for an important related addition to this point. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting to specify this point.
For an analysis of the relevant experimental results on infants for Molyneux’s puzzle see Gallagher (2005), and Smith (2000). For classic studies relevant to the puzzle see Meltzoff (1993), which is accurately discussed by Gallagher (2005). For a recent discussion see Streri (2012). I thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion about this recent empirical reference. I do not focus here on the infant variant of Molyneux’s puzzle. This analysis is indeed important, but deserves separate treatment (see §7.4).
See footnotes 7, 12, 16.
See footnote 16.
I am not committed to any metaphysical claim when I say that a ‘lack’ leads to an ‘inability’. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
MM was tested five months after surgery, and not immediately after restoration of ocular processing, as in the study reported by Held et al. (2011). Also, in the case of Held, five days after the test, the subjects are, with just a natural real world training, better at visually recognizing felt shapes (Held et al. 2011: 552), while MM had difficulty even after several months.
Hence, if we investigate Molyneux’s puzzle by using subjects who have not overcome the critical period, a possible positive answer might be, in principle, positive. However, if we investigate Molyneux’s puzzle by using subjects who have overcome the critical period, the answer might be necessarily negative. The reader should note that this point only suggests that, after the critical period, visual restoration is not possible. However, this point does not rule out the idea that, even before the critical period, it may be very difficult to obtain visual restoration. Thus, the point made in this paper is still relevant. Note that the persistence of luminance detection, which is present in many individuals who present congenital or early-onset blindness due to cataracts, is sufficient to hamper a good functioning of the occipital cortex, as well as other parts of the visual system (Sinha et al. 2014; Held et al. 2011). Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting to mention this evidence.
Some have suggested that visual agnosic (apperceptive) patients’ visual experiences are preserved (maybe due to dorsal stream involvement in some aspects of conscious experience). For Wallhagen (2007), the visual agnosic (apperceptive) patient “DF experiences visually presented shape, but is unable to report that experience because of some problem with conceptualizing aspects of the forms of the objects experienced (Clark 2007: 583)”. Thus, we might be tempted to suppose that the distinction between apperceptive visual agnosia and associative visual agnosia does not hold. However, Wallhagen’s proposal has been deeply undermined by Clark (2007) and Jacob and de Vignemont (2010). Thus, it is safe to say that visual agnosic (apperceptive) patients such as patient DF cannot effectively rely on conscious visual experience of shape and form (Clark 2007: 588, see also 568). So, the distinction between apperceptive and associative visual agnosia as described above (Farah 2004) still holds. Also, though in healthy subjects dorsal processing might play a role in managing information that is then used for ventral conscious processing, it cannot, alone, be responsible for conscious visual recognition (Briscoe 2009; Clark 2007; Brogaard 2011a, 2011b; Wu 2014; Ferretti 2016a, 2016b; Jacob and de Vignemont 2010; Kozuch 2015). Coupling this with the notion, expressed in footnote 11, that ventral processing alone cannot be responsible for action, the contribution that each stream can offer to the other does not challenge the way the dichotomy is settled, concerning the main functions of the streams, or “what still seems to be a real and important division of labour within the neural economy” (Clark 2007: 589). Accordingly, compelling arguments, following neuroscience, suggest such a specific distinction, even contemplating an amount of communication, between the neural correlates, and the respective representations, of visual recognition and those of vision-for-action (see Kozuch 2015). Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting to specify this point.
Everyday objects exhibit geometrical properties such as size, shape, and spatial location. These geometrical properties are, from the motor point of view of the subject, action/motor properties, in that they afford to the subject a precise action possibility satisfiable with a precise motor act, e.g. the geometrical features of a mug can be seen as action properties which open an action possibility (grasping) and which can be satisfied by a proper motor act: a power grip (Ferretti 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d; Nanay 2013: 39).
…though neural commands for muscular contractions are effectively present, but simultaneously blocked by inhibitory mechanisms (Jeannerod 2006: 2.3.3).
…though early components of the process that are on the visual side of the distinction (for example, activity in the earliest parts of the dorsal stream, as in the anterior intraparietal area, AIP) and very late components, (for example, in the F5 portion of the ventral premotor cortex) that are on the motor side of the distinction (Ferretti 2016b: footnote 5).
From the anatomo-functional point of view, the areas computing arm reaching and the areas computing hand shaping are strictly connected (for a review see Ferretti 2016a: 4.3, b: 4.1).
Thus, at best, she/he might need many corrections before reaching the object. This case deals with MQA3, not considered here.
The case of sensory substitution devices might be interesting for this discussion. Imagine a congenitally blind subject who can use a sensory substitution device to catch balls and discriminate letters on a page. It is reasonable to suppose that such a subject has become able to use optical information to perform proper action guidance without being provided with the possibility to rely on normal occipital (visual) processing. It is possible that, having vision properly restored through the sensory substitution device (and bearing in mind what are the constraints for an appropriate restoration concerning the relation between WI and SI), she/he might be able, with the motor knowledge available, to successfully recognize and/or interact with shown objects that are familiar from a tactile point of view. This point is very interesting, but, as argued in footnote 1, this paper does not consider technological-medical improvements of vision through sensory substitution devices and the possibility of a learning obtained through them. This analysis is indeed important but deserves separate treatment. I thank an anonymous referee for soliciting the point.
One might argue that, though there is no possibility of repeated trials, the subject may think and reason for a while before performing an action - this does not conflict with Molyneux’s statement of the question. However, even if we concede thinking and reasoning, it is very unlikely that, without smooth visuomotor processing, which is what allows the subject to succeed in visuomotor behavior, thinking and reasoning might help the subject to succeed at the first attempt. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to include an explanation of this point.
…and what we are avoiding in order to maintain the spirit of MQA2.
The reader should note that Molyneux didn’t specify if this point about verbal instruction is required. Leibniz and Reid have considered whether verbal labels, and/or geometric knowledge, would influence the performance of the newly sighted individual (see Van Cleve 2014). Here I want to maintain this constraint because, as already said, I want to focus on the subject’s own resources, and, arguably, verbal help might improve the performance. (Ibid.) I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to address this point.
I am not denying that there are different cases of optic ataxia and that they might be slightly different due to the nature of the brain damage. There might be differences between different cases of subjects that are lacking correct visual processing (e.g. a newborn, Molyneux subject and the optic ataxic patient; for a similar point see Gallagher 2005).
For different points about the availability of complete restoration see (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003).
Again, one might argue that in slow action ventral processing is responsible for action planning (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006; Briscoe 2009; Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015; Ferretti 2016b; Ferretti forthcoming) and, thus, can be crucial for action (Briscoe 2009). I perfectly agree with this point – see (§§ 1,2) - but here I am considering automatic reach-to-grasp movements for which (only) dorsal processing is responsible. See footnotes 11, 18.
I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to integrate this empirical case in the discussion.
…a process that is mostly, but not totally, due to the possibility of relying on ventral processing. See footnotes 11, 18.
…a process that is mostly, but not totally, due to the possibility of relying on dorsal processing. See footnotes 11, 18.
As I point out in footnote 11, ventral processing is involved in semantic action planning, related to high-order motor aspects, and which selects targets for action. Dorsal processing is involved in motor processing, which shapes the thin spatial and motor parameters and which allows the appropriate and specific motor commands to be triggered (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006). Even assuming that ventral recognition allows the subject to recognize the object and select it for action, the motor parameters would not be accurately computed due to the lack of proper dorsal visuomotor processing. Also, even if some areas related to the ventral pathway, for example the lateral occipital complex, are involved in an important manner in manipulating information that is used by dorsal processing to shape visuomotor interaction (Briscoe and Schwenkler 2015: 3.2), the cutting edge of automatic visuomotor interaction, i.e. the automatic pilot for the hand (Himmelbach et al. 2006; Pisella et al. 2000, see §7), remains the dorsal stream. Without its computational processing, proper automatic interaction cannot be generated even if we recognize the presence of an object we might, in principle, act upon. This is why optic ataxics cannot act on the objects they see, while visual agnosics can act on objects they can’t see. See also footnote 18.
Once again, “Optic ataxia appears to be a disorder limited to transforming visual properties of objects into motor commands for a hand action directed towards these objects. It is not due to misperception of the shape, orientation or size of the objects” (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 92). Also Jacob and Jeannerod briefly refer to Molyneux’s problem (Ibid: 138).
One might argue that, given the evidence that vision-for-action is often impervious to several visual illusions, the newly sighted is more likely to succeed in MQA than she/he is in MQ. However, the reader should note that there is now compelling evidence that even vision-for-action, like visual recognition, can be massively fooled by several kinds of illusions (Franz and Gegenfurtner 2008; Briscoe 2009; Ferretti 2016b: 5.2; Kopiske et al. 2016; Bruno and Battaglini 2008; McIntosh and Schenk 2009). I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting me to explain this point.
It is possible that soon genetic engineers might be able to manipulate DNA in Petri dishes to directly shape, in a laboratory, a visual system so that it can manage optical information before it is implanted in a subject. It would be very interesting to ask whether, in this case, the subject might succeed in proper visual recognition, and successful visuomotor interaction. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to mention this experimental possibility.
Gallagher suggested that, due to the cortical deterioration, the proposal by Evans would fail (2005).
Of course, we might think of an ‘ideal’ situation in which the subject would not have the several problems suggested by the empirical analysis. In this situation, we might think, this ‘ideal’ subject would be able to accomplish both the recognition and the interaction task. On this point see Gallagher (2005). Here the discussion is limited to the situation we can reach according to what we know from the neurophysiology of vision.
This work was supported by the ‘Fondazione Franco e Marilisa Caligara per l’Alta Formazione Interdisciplinare’. I have several special thanks to offer. The first goes to Bence Nanay, for his numerous crucial suggestions concerning this project. The second goes to two anonymous referees, whose crucial and insightful comments have allowed me to improve significantly the first version of this paper. The third goes to Brian Glenney, for his specific comments. Very special thanks go to these scholars who enthusiastically discussed with me the part of the paper related to Molyneux’s question and action: John Schwenkler, Robert Briscoe, Nicola Bruno and Eris Chinellato. I also have to thank those scholars who have discussed with me, on several occasions, several points tackled by this paper: Andrea Borghini, Silvano Zipoli Caiani, Chiara Brozzo, Anna Maria Borghi, Giorgia Committeri, Corrado Sinigaglia, Pierre Jacob, Neil Van Leuween, Mario Alai, Claudio Calosi, Riccardo Cuppini, Mirko Tagliaferri, Vincenzo Fano. Finally, special thanks go to the students in Philosophy in Urbino, who attended my lessons in ‘Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science’ and offered several points on this topic, as well as to the students in Motor Science in Urbino, who attended my talk on the topic of this paper, under the teaching of ‘Neurophysiology’.
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Ferretti, G. Two visual systems in Molyneux subjects. Phenom Cogn Sci 17, 643–679 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9533-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9533-z