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The epistemic benefits of deliberative democracy

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Abstract

One instrumental defense of democracy is epistemic in character: Insofar as there is a correct answer to be found to some question being politically addressed, democratic decision-making procedures are more likely to find it than any other. But that assumes that the correct answer appears on the agenda in the first place, and that the agenda is not so cluttered that it gets lost there. Two-stage deliberative procedures can help with both problems, first by populating the agenda and then by winnowing it. A good example of both occurring is found in the detailed records now available of top secret ExComm deliberations surrounding the US government’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

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Notes

  1. On this account, democracy is ‘a process of counting heads to save the trouble of breaking them,’ as Lindsay (1929, pp. 36–37) derisively characterizes it.

  2. Przeworski and Sprague (1986).

  3. Williams (2007), Geuss (2008), Runciman (2016).

  4. The name is Cohen’s (1986), although the idea is much older.

  5. Mill (1859/1977), ch. 2. There he writes: ‘[Man] is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be beought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning’ (p. 231). See similarly: Rawls (1971, pp. 357–359), Talisse (2005, 2009), Knight and Johnson (2011).

  6. Condorcet (1785). Following in that tradition, see: Barry (1964, p. 9), Grofman et al. (1983), Grofman and Feld (1988), Young (1988); List and Goodin (2001); Goodin (2005, chs 5-6, 2008, pp. 78–86); Goodin and Spiekermann (2016). For a variation on this theme, see Estlund (2008).

  7. For example Boland (1989); for a survey, see Goodin and Spiekermann (2016, esp. chs. 3-5). Most typically, the arguments are of the form that the theorem is robust against realistic relaxations to its original and seemingly too demanding assumptions.

  8. List and Goodin (2001).

  9. Dahl (1979).

  10. Miller (1992).

  11. Of course, we can vote over what to vote on: but that presupposes a prior determination of what to consider to vote on, and at some point that must be given by some mechanism other than voting.

  12. This would in effect be to employ a submajority rule (Vermeule 2005) to put items onto the agenda, followed by a standard majority rule procedure to decide among the items on the agenda.

  13. A marriage I have commended before on various grounds, one of the present ones among them (Goodin 2008, chs. 4-6).

  14. It certainly should be, according to the policy prescriptions of policy scientists. See, for just one example, Brewer and De Leon (1983, pp. 17–21 and chs 2, 7).

  15. As I have observed before (Goodin 2008, pp. 122–4).

  16. The only exception, according to Dryzek (2009), has been the Australian Citizen’s Parliament.

  17. Hobbes (1651, ch. 6).

  18. Policy analysts keenly appreciate that ‘the generation of alternatives… is vital step in the overall policy process. Without a carefully prepared set of policy choices, the decision maker has to rely on a limited set of personal resources or blind luck’ (Brewer and De Leon 1983, p. 61).

  19. March (1976, p. 261). Zolberg (1972) comments similarly on the ‘moments of madness’ that come in the wake of successful revolutions. Policy analysts MacRae and Wilde (1979, pp. 97, 98) say similarly: ‘It is important that your initial consideration of alternatives be imaginative and creative. A wide variety of alternatives dealing with larger and smaller aspects of the problem need to be considered. In this way you will be less likely to ignore important options, and you will later have more options for compromise and negotiation to increase the political feasibility of your policy recommendations… Once you have set forth a wide range of alternatives, you will then wish to reduce this list to manageable form by rapid scanning.’

  20. Brewer (1975, pp. 453–456).

  21. Vermeule (2011, p. 1451). This design is as was recommended in Osborn’s (1948) original pop psychology book that coined the term ‘brainstorming.’ Fung (2003, p. 345) commends deliberative designs that combine ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ deliberation on similar grounds.

  22. Nemeth et al. (2004). Sawyer (2007, ch. 4). For evidence, that critical engagement with one another’s proposals overcomes many other known problems with deliberative designs (e.g., Sunstein 2006, pp. 75–102), see Mercier and Landemore (2012).

  23. Maass (1983, p. 39).

  24. Condorcet (1793/1994, p. 193).

  25. Lindsay (1929, p. 36).

  26. Lindsay’s hope that it will be an even-handed decision, apart.

  27. Written documentation, including memoranda summarizing ExComm discussions, can be found at: US Department of State (1996), and US CIA (1992).

  28. The transcribed version of those recordings is printed in May and Zelikow (1997).

  29. Kennedy (1969, p. 46). See similarly Sorensen (1965, p. 679): ‘One of the most remarkable aspects of those meetings was a sense of complete equality. Protocol mattered little when the nation's life was at stake.’

  30. May and Zelikow (1997, pp. 54, 56).

  31. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 57).

  32. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 58).

  33. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 66).

  34. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 66).

  35. May and Zelikow (1997, pp. 71–72).

  36. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 86).

  37. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 94). At the very end of the discussion, the president asked the vice president, ‘do you have any thoughts? Between [air strike options] one and two?’ (May and Zelikow 1997, p. 103).

  38. May and Zelikow (1997, pp. 112–113).

  39. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 114).

  40. McCone (1962).

  41. US ExComm (1962a).

  42. McCone (1962).

  43. Quoted in footnote annotation to McCone (1962).

  44. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 157), emphasis added. McNamara returned to reiterate the proposal later in the meeting (May and Zelikow 1997, p. 162).

  45. May and Zelikow (1997 p. 158).

  46. According to the official record of that meeting kept by the CIA Director (US ExComm 1962a; see similarly McCone 1962)—the meeting had been held in a State Department conference room in which no tape recorders were installed, so there is no complete transcript of that day’s deliberations.

  47. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 163).

  48. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 166). In his memoir, Thirteen Days, Robert Kennedy reports that ‘Secretary McNamara, by Wednesday, had become the blockade’s strongest advocate’ (1969, p. 34). But there is no tape recording of that Wed 18 October ExComm meeting, nor are views on the blockade attributed to any particular individuals in the official memorandum detailing the meeting (US ExComm 1962a). So there is no way to cross-check Kennedy’s memory on this point. McNamara’s cautious phrasing of his support for the blockade option the next day, quoted above, would seem to belie Kennedy’s claim.

  49. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 171).

  50. May and Zelikow (1997, p. 172).

  51. Democratic theorist Lindsay (1929, p. 37), one of the earliest defenders of ‘government by discussion,’ wrote similarly: ‘Every scientific discoverer knows that what he most wants to know is not what can be said for, but what can be said against his theory. What he most wants is an opposition’; and ‘any one with experience of the effectiveness of discussion in a small… society must recognize how valuable is the contribution of those who are not easily convinced but can stand up resolutely for their own point of view.’

  52. US ExComm (1962b).

  53. Again, there was no tape recording of this meeting; this report comes from US NSC (1962); see also the description of events in May and Zelikow (1997, p. 199).

  54. Neustadt and May (1986, p. 6, 7).

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  1. School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 2601, Australia

    Robert E. Goodin

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Goodin, R.E. The epistemic benefits of deliberative democracy. Policy Sci 50, 351–366 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-017-9286-0

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