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Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism

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Abstract

Drawing on a wide range of literature and ideas, a new “second-generation theory of fiscal federalism” is emerging that provides new insights into the structure and working of federal systems. After a restatement and review of the first-generation theory, this paper surveys this new body of work and offers some thoughts on the ways in which it is extending our understanding of fiscal federalism and on its implications for the design of fiscal institutions.

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  1. Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20782, USA

    Wallace E. Oates

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  1. Wallace E. Oates
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Correspondence to Wallace E. Oates.

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JEL Code: H77, H11

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Oates, W.E. Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism. Int Tax Public Finan 12, 349–373 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-005-1619-9

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