Abstract
I consider the broad perspectives in biology known as ‘functionalism’ and ‘structuralism’, as well as a modern version of functionalism, ‘adaptationism’. I do not take a position on which of these perspectives is preferable; my concern is with the prior question, how should they be understood? Adapting van Fraassen’s argument for treating materialism as a stance, rather than a factual belief with propositional content, in the first part of the paper I offer an argument for construing functionalism and structuralism as stances also. The argument draws especially on Gould’s (The structure of evolutionary theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002) insights concerning functionalism and structuralism, in particular their apparent historical continuity from the pre-Darwinian period through to today. In the second part of the paper I consider Godfrey-Smith’s distinction between empirical and explanatory adaptationism, and suggest that while the former is an empirical scientific hypothesis, the latter is closely related to the functionalist stance.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Also sometimes called ‘formalism’.
Vicente, for example, argues that materialism can be understood as the claim that ‘everything that exists comes down to a list of conserved quantities, bodies that possess them, and forces that mediate their exchange’ (2011, 402). Melnyk (1997) suggests that materialism can be defined in terms of current physics, and that while this means that there is a reasonable chance that it will turn out to be false, it has enough of a chance of being true (and is in any case sufficiently superior to its relevant rivals) that it is still worthy of serious consideration.
There has been much debate about the nature and content of materialism in recent years, and I can’t do justice to it here. For useful discussions (including discussions of and responses to Hempel’s dilemma) see Melnyk (1997, 2003), Stoljar (2009), and Vicente (2011). For a direct response to van Fraassen’s arguments regarding materialism see Bitbol (2007). Ladyman (2011), and Ladyman et al. (2007), accept that van Fraassen has shown that materialism should be thought of as a stance. But they, unlike van Fraassen, accept the materialist stance, and argue for a combination of the materialist stance and the empiricist stance, which they call the ‘scientistic stance’. Rosenberg defends a version of the scientistic stance in his latest popular book (2012). See Dupre (1993) for an extended critique of scientism. See also Kitcher (2012).
Those who defend the meaningfulness and validity of materialism as a doctrine/belief would typically deny either premise (2) or premise (3) (Vicente (2011) for instance, denies premise (2)). However Melnyk (1997) accepts both these premises, but still regards materialism as worthy of belief. Those who take the second view I mentioned above—that there is no interesting or worthwhile materialist position—would stop at premise (4).
A common complaint against the stance approach is that it would lead to a kind of emotivism, according to which philosophical opinion is taken to be merely the subjective expression of values. In that case, so the argument goes, stances would be rendered unsusceptible to rational scrutiny. See Ho (2007) for an argument in this vein. See also Jauernig (2007) and Ladyman (2004). See van Fraassen (2002, 62; 2004b, 9, 17; 2007, 375–378) for replies to these sorts of claims. See also his (2004c) for a discussion of the relation between stances and values. I have addressed this issue in Boucher (2012, 115–120).
See Boucher (2012, Chapter 4) for a detailed discussion of the question of how a stance can be rationally assessed.
van Fraassen (2004b, 173, 176) notes that there is a certain ‘pragmatic incoherence’ involved in adopting a stance while denying certain characteristic beliefs naturally or typically associated with it. See also Rowbottom (2005, 206, 210) for a similar view. Ladyman (2004, 139) suggests the stronger view that believing certain factual theses may be a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for adopting a given stance (Mohler 2007 defends a similar view). Boucher (2012, 28–29) disputes this, arguing that, strictly speaking, for each stance, there are no factual beliefs that are either necessary or sufficient for adopting that stance.
This point (along with the previous one) follows trivially from the fact that stances are not beliefs, and are nonpropositional, so cannot stand in relations of entailment or justification. But it also coheres with van Fraassen’s more general views on the relationship between science and metaphysics, if we think of stances as typically metaphysical (which I think we should); see e.g. van Fraassen (1996, 149, 175).
In Boucher (2014) I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives, or ways of seeing the world. I consider the popular suggestion, defended especially by Teller (2004) and Chakravartty (2004, 2007), that stances should be understood as epistemic policies, and argue that this is consistent with my account, although it differs in emphasis. But I criticize Rowbottom’s (2011) view that stances should be assimilated to Kuhnian paradigms, or research programs. Stances differ from the latter in several important respects, such that the comparison is not helpful. I don’t have the space here to go into these issues. The argument of the paper doesn’t depend on the acceptance of any particular account of stances—any account that is consistent with the seven bullet points above will be adequate for my purposes.
Indeed accepting the bare notion of inheritance from a common ancestor as accounting for observed unity of type is not sufficient to make one a structuralist, since the idea is fully compatible with Darwinian functionalism, just as the bare notion that selection explains adaptation is (at least on most accounts) not sufficient to define functionalism or, later, adaptationism (see below).
One apparent difference between this argument and the classic formulation of the materialism argument I presented above is that this argument refers to the past, whereas the materialism argument in its typical form refers to the future. But I trust it is clear that they are making the same basic point: the metaphysical stances in question cannot be essentially yoked to particular theories (whether in the past, the present or the future) lest they share their fate (and lest their historical continuity be lost). We have seen that van Fraassen’s version of the materialism dilemma (2002) focuses more on materialism’s past that its future. This means that the argument about functionalism and structuralism doesn’t depend on the likelihood of future revolutionary paradigm shifts in biology (which might be thought less likely than in physics), since the claim is that whatever happens in the future, the stance view is still needed to make sense of the past and present.
See Gould (2002, 255–256) for a discussion of the form that such arguments about relative frequency tend to take.
He distinguishes a third kind of adaptationism, ‘methodological adaptationism’. This is the view that ‘[t]he best way for scientists to approach biological systems is to look for features of adaptation and good design. Adaptation is a good ‘organising concept’ for evolutionary research’ (2001, 337). It is purely a ‘policy recommendation’; it ‘recommends a heuristic, and no more’ (ibid, 337–338; see also Resnik 1997). He argues that this view is logically independent of both empirical and explanatory adaptationism, however empirical adaptationism may support methodological adaptationism, and the success of the latter may lend support to the former (ibid, 341–342).
Lewens (2009a) distinguishes seven kinds of adaptationism. His discussion builds on Godfrey-Smith’s, and can in the main be thought of as adding nuance to Godfrey-Smith’s distinctions, rather than replacing them.
It should be noted that, according to Godfrey-Smith, Darwinian explanatory adaptationists are not just fascinated by apparent design. They regard it as a special problem for a naturalistic, secular worldview—a special, unique challenge for such a worldview, that must be answered for that worldview to be viable (Godfrey-Smith 2001, 349–351).
‘Although many might agree that we find apparent design in nature interesting, this is apparently just a fact about our psychology. As onlookers, we are puzzled by some things and untroubled by others, but why should we take this to reflect differences between objectively puzzling and objectively unpuzzling states of affairs in nature itself? … If this objection is correct … it turns out that explanatory adaptationism … is not a scientific position at all, but just a set of preferences that some people happen to hold’ (Godfrey-Smith 1999, 188). If explanatory adaptationism is interpreted as a stance however, we can agree with Godfrey-Smith’s objector that it is not a scientific position, without dismissing it as ‘just a set of preferences that some people happen to hold’; see below.
See Godfrey-Smith (1999): here he makes the point that explanatory adaptationists have accepted the questions posed by natural theology about adaptation, but have given a different answer. He notes that one may object that we should reject not just the answers given by natural theology, but the questions they asked as well. This objection can be interpreted as a denial of the possibility of genuine continuity across the Darwinian boundary: to the extent that evolutionists are worrying about design, they are not really being consistent evolutionists, but are still clinging to the terms of argument of natural theology. So there can be no genuine commonality of adaptationist/functionalist stance between natural theologians and Darwinians. The two worldviews differ not just in their beliefs (the answers they give) but in their stances (the questions they ask).
Godfrey-Smith (2001, 337) acknowledges that it is ‘possible in principle’ to hold the view that apparent design and adaptation are the big questions, without holding that selection is the big answer, but he doesn’t seem to notice, at least in this paper, that this is precisely the position of pre-Darwinian functionalists.
Arguably something else that structuralists of different eras have had in common is a commitment to ‘typological thinking’. Mayr ([1959] 1976) famously defined typological thinking as the approach which posits a small number of forms underlying biological diversity, and the view that it is those forms that are, in some sense, metaphysically ‘real’, while the variation we observe is secondary and ephemeral. It is opposed to ‘population thinking’, which sees variation as in some sense metaphysically primary (Lewens 2009b; see also Sober 1980). There is little doubt that typological thinking as characterised by Mayr underlay the views of the pre-Darwinian structuralists I have mentioned. According to Mayr, with the advent of Darwinism, typological thinking was replaced by population thinking throughout biological thought. While this may have been the case in general, in a recent paper Lewens (2009b) argues convincingly that a form of typological thinking (an acceptable form, he thinks) survives in modern evolutionary developmental biology. It isn’t the case that all modern structuralists share this commitment—Gould himself, for instance, is a modern structuralist but has written an entire book critiquing typological thinking (1996). Typological thinking is plausibly thought of as a component part of the metaphysical stance of most or all pre-Darwinian structuralists, and that of some modern structuralists. (It is less clear that population thinking forms part of the functionalist stance in any very meaningful sense however.).
For convenience I have been focusing in this section on the adaptationist/functionalist stance, but it should be clear that what I have said applies equally to the structuralist stance, and its relationship to empirical scientific inquiry.
See Grimm (2008) for an interesting discussion of the kinds of factors that contribute to a phenomenon being interesting, striking or puzzling enough to demand an explanation.
References
Agassiz L (1857) Essay on classification. In: Contributions to the natural history of the United States, vol 1. Boston MA, Little Brown and Co
Appel TA (1987) The Cuvier-Geoffroy debate: French biology in the decades before Darwin. Oxford University Press, New York
Baumann P (2011) Empiricism, stances and the problem of voluntarism. Synthese 178(1):27–36
Bitbol M (2007) Materialism, stances, and open-mindedness. In: Monton B (ed) Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 229–270
BonJour (1998) In defense of pure reason: a rationalist account of a priori justification. Cambridge University Press, New York
Boucher AC (2012) Empiricism, metaphysical stances and the philosophy of biology. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne, Australia
Boucher AC (2014) What is a philosophical stance? paradigms, policies and perspectives. Synthese 191(10):2315–2332
Chakravartty A (2004) Stance relativism: empiricism versus metaphysics. Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 35(1):173–184
Chakravartty A (2007) A metaphysics for scientific realism: knowing the unobservable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Chakravartty A (2011) A puzzle about voluntarism about rational epistemic stances. Synthese 178(1):37–48
Crane T, Mellor DH (1990) There is no question of physicalism. Mind 99(394):185–206
Cronin H (1991) The ant and the peacock. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK
Cruse P (2007) van Fraassen on the nature of empiricism. Metaphilosophy 38(4):489–508
Cuvier G (1800–1805) Lecons d’anatomie comparee de G. Cuvier, recueillies et publiees sous ses yeux par C. Dumeril. C. Dumeril (ed) vol 1–2; G.-L. Duvernoy, (ed) vol 3–5, Paris
Dawkins R (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford University Press, New York
Dawkins R (1982) The extended phenotype. Oxford University Press, New York
Dawkins R (1987) The blind watchmaker. W.W. Norton, New York
Dawkins R (1996) Climbing mount improbable. W. W. Norton, New York
Dennett DC (1995) Darwin’s dangerous idea. Penguin, London
Dupre J (ed) (1987) The latest on the best: essays on evolution and optimality. MIT, Cambridge
Dupre J (1993) The disorder of things: metaphysical foundations for the disunity of science. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Finch A (2003) Book Review: the empirical stance by Bas C. van Fraassen. Am Cathol Philos Q 77(2):302–307
Forber P (ed) (2009) Special issue of Biology and Philosophy on 30th Anniversary of Gould and Lewontin’s The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Program
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire E (1818) Philosophie Anatomique. vol 1, Des organs respiratoires sous le rapport de la determination et de l’identite de leurs pieces osseuses. Paris: J.-B. Bailliere
Ghiselin MT (1994) Darwin’s language may seem teleological, but his thinking is another matter. Biol Philos 9(4):489–492
Godfrey-Smith P (1999) Adaptationism and the power of selection. Biol Philos 14(2):181–194
Godfrey-Smith P (2001) Three kinds of adaptationism. In: SH Orzack and E Sober (eds) Adaptationism and optimality. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp 335–357
Goodwin B (1994) How the leopard changed its spots: the evolution of complexity. Simon and Schuster, New York
Gould SJ (1983) Hyena myths and realities. Reprinted in SJ Gould. Hen’s teeth and horse’s toes. New York, NY, W.W. Norton, pp 147–157
Gould SJ (1996) Life’s grandeur: the spread of excellence from plato to Darwin. Jonathon Cape, London
Gould SJ (1997) The exaptive excellence of spandrels as a term and prototype. PNAS 94(20):10750–10755
Gould SJ (2002) The structure of evolutionary theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Gould SJ, Lewontin RC (1979) The spandrels of san marco and the panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist program. Proc R Soc Lond B 205:581–598
Grene M, Depew D (2004) The philosophy of biology: an episodic history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Grimm SR (2008) Explanatory inquiry and the need for explanation. Br J Philos Sci 59(3):481–497
Hempel CG (1980) Comments on Goodman’s ways of worldmaking. Synthese 45(2):193–199
Ho D (2007) Farewell to empiricism. In: B Monton (ed) Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 319–333
Horsten L (2004) Book Review: Bas C. van Fraassen: The empirical stance. Int Stud Philos Sci 18: 95–97
Hull D, Ruse M (eds) (1998) The philosophy of biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Jauernig A (2007) Must empiricism be a stance, and could it be one? how to be an empiricist and a philosopher at the same time. In: B Monton (ed) Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 271–318
Kauffman SA (1993) The origin of order: self-organisation and selection in evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Kitcher P (2012) The trouble with scientism: why history and the humanities are also a form of knowledge. New Republic, May 24, 2012
Ladyman J (2004) Empiricism versus metaphysics. Philos Stud 121(2):133–145
Ladyman J, Ross D, with Spurrett D, Collier J (2007) Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. Oxford, Oxford University Press
Ladyman J (2011) The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled. Synthese 178(1):87–98
Lennox JG (1993) Darwin was a teleologist. Biol Philos 8(4):409–421
Lennox JG (1994) Teleology by another name: a reply to Ghiselin. Biol Philos 9(4):493–495
Lewens T (2009a) Seven types of adaptationism. Biol Philos 24(2):161–182
Lewens T (2009b) What is wrong with typological thinking? Philos Sci 76(3):355–371
Maynard Smith J (1987) How to model evolution. In: Dupre J (ed) The latest on the best: essays on evolution and optimality. MIT, Cambridge, pp 119–131
Mayr E ([1959] 1976) Typological versus population thinking: in evolution and the diversity of life. Reprint. Originally published as “Darwin and the Evolutionary Theory in Biology”, in J Meggers (ed) Evolution and anthropology: a centennial appraisal (Washington, DC, Anthropological Society of Washington), pp 1–10. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp 26–29
McMullin E (2007) Taking an empirical stance. In: Monton B (ed) Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 167–182
Melnyk A (1997) How to keep the ‘Physical’ in physicalism. J Philos 94(12):622–637
Melnyk A (2003) A physicalist manifesto: thoroughly modern materialism. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY
Millikan R (1989) In defense of proper functions. Philos Sci 56:288–302
Mohler C (2007) The dilemma of empiricist belief. In: Monton B (ed) Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 209–228
Neander K (1991) Functions as selected effects: the conceptual analyst’s defence. Philos Sci 58:168–184
Orzack SH, Sober E (eds) (2001) Adaptationism and optimality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Owen R (1848) On the archetype and homologies of the vertebrate skeleton. Voorst, London
Paley W (1802) Natural theology. R. Faulder, London
Resnik D (1997) Adaptationism: hypothesis or heuristic? Biol Philos 12:38–50
Rosenberg A (2012) The atheist’s guide to reality: enjoying life without illusions. W.W. Norton, New York
Rowbottom DP (2005) The empirical stance vs. the critical attitude. S Afr J Philos 24(3):200–223
Rowbottom DP (2011) Stances and paradigms: a reflection. Synthese 178(1):111–119
Rowbottom DP, Bueno O (2011) How to change it: modes of engagement, rationality, and stance voluntarism. Synthese 178(1):7–17
Ruse M (1979) The Darwinian revolution: science red in tooth and claw. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Ruse M (2003) Darwin and design: does evolution have a purpose?. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Russell ES (1916) Form and function. Murray, London
Sober E (1980) Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism. Philos Sci 47:350–383
Stoljar D (2009) Physicalism. Routledge, London
Teller P (2004) What is a stance? Philos Stud 121(2):159–170
van Fraassen BC (1980) The scientific image. Clarendon Press, Oxford
van Fraassen BC (1994) Against transcendental empiricism. In: Stapleton T (ed) The question of hermeneutics. Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp 309–335
van Fraassen BC (1995) Against naturalised epistemology. In: Leonardi P, Santambrogio M (eds) On quine. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp 68–88
van Fraassen BC (1996) Science, materialism and false consciousness. In: Kvanvig JL (ed) Warrant in contemporary epistemology: essays in honor of plantinga’s theory of knowledge. Lanham, Md, Rowman and Littlefield, pp 149–181
van Fraassen BC (2002) The empirical stance. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT
van Fraassen BC (2004a) Précis of the empirical stance. Philos Stud 121(2):127–132
van Fraassen BC (2004b) Replies to discussion on the empirical stance. Philos Stud 121(2):171–192
van Fraassen BC (2004c) Reply to Chakravartty, Jauernig, and McMullin, unpublished typescript of a talk delivered at a symposium on The Empirical Stance at the Pacific APA in Pasadena, CA
van Fraassen BC (2007) From a view of science to a new empiricism. In: Monton B (ed) Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 337–383
van Fraassen BC (2011) On stance and rationality. Synthese 178(1):155–169
Vicente A (2011) Current physics and ‘The Physical’. Br J Philos Sci 62:393–416
von Goethe JW (1790) Versuch der Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu Erklaren. Gotha, Etting
Williams GC (1992) Natural selection: domains, levels and challenges. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Wright L (1973) Functions. Philos Rev 82:139–168
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Boucher, S.C. Functionalism and structuralism as philosophical stances: van Fraassen meets the philosophy of biology. Biol Philos 30, 383–403 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9453-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9453-z