Skip to main content
Log in

Tight Bounds for Selfish and Greedy Load Balancing

  • Published:
Algorithmica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We study the load balancing problem in the context of a set of clients each wishing to run a job on a server selected among a subset of permissible servers for the particular client. We consider two different scenarios. In selfish load balancing, each client is selfish in the sense that it chooses, among its permissible servers, to run its job on the server having the smallest latency given the assignments of the jobs of other clients to servers. In online load balancing, clients appear online and, when a client appears, it has to make an irrevocable decision and assign its job to one of its permissible servers. Here, we assume that the clients aim to optimize some global criterion but in an online fashion. A natural local optimization criterion that can be used by each client when making its decision is to assign its job to that server that gives the minimum increase of the global objective. This gives rise to greedy online solutions. The aim of this paper is to determine how much the quality of load balancing is affected by selfishness and greediness.

We characterize almost completely the impact of selfishness and greediness in load balancing by presenting new and improved, tight or almost tight bounds on the price of anarchy of selfish load balancing as well as on the competitiveness of the greedy algorithm for online load balancing when the objective is to minimize the total latency of all clients on servers with linear latency functions. In addition, we prove a tight upper bound on the price of stability of linear congestion games.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Aland, S., Dumrauf, D., Gairing, M., Monien, B., Schoppmann, F.: Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS ’06), LNCS, vol. 3884, pp. 218–229. Springer, Berlin (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Alon, N., Azar, Y., Woeginger, G.J., Yadid, T.: Approximation schemes for scheduling. In: Proceedings of the 8th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA ’97), pp. 493–500 (1997)

  3. Anshelevich, E., Dasgupta, A., Kleinberg, J.M., Tardos, E., Wexler, T., Roughgarden, T.: The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. SIAM J. Comput. 38(4), 1602–1623 (2008)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Avidor, A., Azar, Y., Sgall, J.: Ancient and new algorithms for load balancing in the L p norm. Algorithmica 29(3), 422–441 (2001)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Awerbuch, B., Azar, Y., Grove, E.F., Kao, M.-Y., Krishnan, P., Vitter, J.S.: Load balancing in the L p norm. In: Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS ’95), pp. 383–391 (1995)

  6. Awerbuch, B., Azar, Y., Epstein, A.: The price of routing unsplittable flow. In: Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’05), pp. 57–66 (2005)

  7. Azar, Y., Epstein, A.: Convex programming for scheduling unrelated parallel machines. In: Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’05), pp. 331–337 (2005)

  8. Caragiannis, I.: Better bounds for online load balancing on unrelated machines. In: Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA ’08), pp. 972–981 (2008)

  9. Chandra, A.K., Wong, C.K.: Worst-case analysis of a placement algorithm related to storage allocation. SIAM J. Comput. 4(3), 249–263 (1975)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E.: The price of anarchy of finite congestion games. In: Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’05), pp. 67–73 (2005)

  11. Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E.: On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games. In: Proceedings of the 13th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA ’05), LNCS, vol. 3669, pp. 59–70. Springer, Berlin (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Christodoulou, G., Mirrokni, V., Sidiropoulos, A.: Convergence and approximation in potential games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS ’06), pp. 349–260 (2006)

  13. Cody, R.A., Coffman, E.G.: Record allocation for minimizing expected retrieval costs on drum-like storage devices. J. ACM 23(1), 103–115 (1976)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Cominetti, R., Correa, J.R., Stier Moses, N.E.: Network games with atomic players. In: Proceedings of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP ’06), LNCS, vol. 4168, pp. 525–536. Springer, Berlin (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Czumaj, A., Vöcking, B.: Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria. ACM Trans. Algorithms 3(1), (2007)

  16. Fabrikant, A., Papadimitriou, C., Talwar, K.: On the complexity of pure equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’04), pp. 604–612 (2004)

  17. Fotakis, D., Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Mavronicolas, M., Spirakis, P.: The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game. Theor. Comput. Sci. 410(36), 3305–3326 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Fotakis, D., Kontogiannis, S., Spirakis, P.: Selfish unsplittable flows. Theor. Comput. Sci. 348(2–3), 226–239 (2005)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Gairing, M., Lücking, T., Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B.: Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links. In: Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’04), pp. 613–622 (2004)

  20. Gairing, M., Lücking, T., Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B.: The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost. Theor. Comput. Sci. 369(1–3), 116–135 (2006)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Gairing, M., Lücking, T., Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B., Rode, M.: Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 74(7), 1199–1225 (2008)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  22. Koutsoupias, E., Mavronicolas, M., Spirakis, P.: Approximate equilibria and ball fusion. Theory Comput. Syst. 36(6), 683–693 (2003)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  23. Koutsoupias, E., Papadimitriou, C.: Worst-case equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS ’99), LNCS, vol. 1563, pp. 404–413. Springer, Berlin (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Lücking, T., Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B., Rode, M.: A new model for selfish routing. Theor. Comput. Sci. 406(3), 187–206 (2008)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  25. Mavronicolas, M., Spirakis, P.: The price of selfish routing. Algorithmica 48(1), 91–126 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  26. Monderer, D., Shapley, L.S.: Potential games. Games Econ. Behav. 14, 124–143 (1996)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  27. Papadimitriou, C.: Algorithms, games and the internet. In: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’01), pp. 749–753 (2001)

  28. Phillips, S., Westbrook, J.: Online load balancing and network flow. In: Proceedings of the 25th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’93), pp. 402–411 (1993)

  29. Rosenthal, R.: A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Int. J. Game Theory 2, 65–67 (1973)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  30. Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E.: How bad is selfish routing? J. ACM 49(2), 236–259 (2002)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  31. Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E.: Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games. Games Econ. Behav. 47(2), 389–403 (2004)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  32. Shmoys, D., Wein, J., Williamson, D.: Scheduling parallel machines on-line. SIAM J. Comput. 24(6), 1313–1331 (1995)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  33. Suri, S., Tóth, C., Zhou, Y.: Selfish load balancing and atomic congestion games. Algorithmica 47(1), 79–96 (2007)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christos Kaklamanis.

Additional information

A preliminary version of the results in this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP ’06), LNCS, vol. 4168, pp. 184–195. Springer, Berlin (2006). This work was partially supported by the European Union under IST FET Integrated Project 015964 AEOLUS and COST Action 293 GRAAL, and by a “Caratheodory” basic research grant from the University of Patras.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Caragiannis, I., Flammini, M., Kaklamanis, C. et al. Tight Bounds for Selfish and Greedy Load Balancing. Algorithmica 61, 606–637 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9427-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-010-9427-8

Keywords

Navigation