Summary.
This paper reports an experiment on two-player sequential bargaining with asymmetric information that features some forces present in multi-round monopoly pricing environments. Buyer-seller pairs play a series of bargaining games that last for either one or two rounds of offers. The treatment variable is the probability of continuing into a second round. Equilibrium predictions do a poor job of explaining levels of prices and treatment effects. As an alternative to the conventional equilibrium model, we consider models that allow for bounded rationality of subjects. The quantal response equilibrium model captures some of the important features of the results.
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Received: 30 April 2003, Revised: 10 December 2003,
JEL Classification Numbers:
C78, D82, D42, C91.
Correspondence to: Timothy N. Cason
This research was funded in part by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9809110). The experiments were run at the Economic Science Laboratory of the University of Arizona and the Krannert Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research at Purdue University, using the z-Tree software developed at the Institute for Empirical Research at the University of Zurich (Fischbacher [8]). David Cooper, Rachel Croson, Charles Noussair, an anonymous referee, and conference participants at the Economic Science Association and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings provided helpful comments. Timothy O’Neill Dang, Thomas Wilkening and Marikah Mancini provided expert research assistance.
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Cason, T.N., Reynolds, S.S. Bounded rationality in laboratory bargaining with asymmetric information. Economic Theory 25, 553–574 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0464-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0464-2