Abstract
This paper examines pollution regulation in a dynamic setting with complete information. We show that tradeable pollution permits may not achieve the social optimum even when the permit market is perfectly competitive. The reason is that the optimal tradeable permits regulation will typically be time inconsistent. We then show that pollution taxes can achieve the first best and are time consistent.
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We thank Claudio Mezzetti, Wally Oates, and Paul Rhode for helpful comments. The last two authors thank the National Science Foundation for financial support.
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Biglaiser, G., Horowitz, J.K. & Quiggin, J. Dynamic pollution regulation. J Regul Econ 8, 33–44 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01066598
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01066598