Abstract
Truth-maker analyses construe truth as existence of proof, a well-known example being that offered by Wittgenstein in theTractatus. The paper subsumes the intuitionistic view of truth as existence of proof under the general truth-maker scheme. Two generic constraints on truth-maker analysis are noted and positioned with respect to the writings of Michael Dummett and theTractatus. Examination of the writings of Brouwer, Heyting and Weyl indicates the specific notions of truth-maker and existence that are at issue in the intuitionistic truth-maker analysis, namely that of proof in the sense of proof-object (Brouwer, Heyting) and existence in the nonpropositional sense of a judgement abstract (Weyl). Furthermore, possible anticipations in the writings of Schlick and Pfänder are noted.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
The present paper was written during a sabbatical leave while visiting the Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, I am indebted to the Department, as well as to the Wenner-Gren Foundation, Stockholm, for financial support that made the visit possible. Per Martin-Löf read the paper in manuscript and suggested a number of improvements. Unless otherwise indicated the English translations are my own.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sundholm, G. Existence, proof and truth-making: A perspective on the intuitionistic conception of truth. Topoi 13, 117–126 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00763510
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00763510