Boko Haram insurgency: a decade of dynamic evolution and struggle for a caliphate

Abstract

Since 2009 when Boko Haram launched its first attack in Nigeria, the terrorist sect has remained a significant security and economic threat to the countries of the Lake Chad region. While moderate successes were recorded between 2015 and 2016, with the government maintaining that the insurgent sect has been technically defeated, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Using the historical approach as its research methodology, this paper analyses the factors responsible for the sect’s resurgence, and Nigeria’s response. It argues that Nigeria’s failure to nip the insurgency in the bud is attributable to two main factors: the emergence, growing, and unchecked influence of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISAWP) in the Lake Chad region, and the unresolved ill-equipped state of the Nigerian military. The paper submits that any serious attempt aimed at arresting this trend must begin by addressing these issues.

Chapter 2 was originally published as Amao, O. B. Security Journal (2020) 33: 357–375. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00232-8.