Abstract
We consider an imbalanced wireless network setup in which a low-power client communicates with a powerful server. We assume that public key cryptographic operations such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange conducted over a large multiplicative group is too computationally intensive for a low-power client to implement. In this paper, we propose an authenticatedk ey exchange protocol such that it is efficient enough to be implemented on most of the target low-power devices such as devices in sensor networks, smart cards and low-power Personal Digital Assistants. In addition, it is secure against dictionary attacks. Our scheme requires less than 2.5 seconds of pure computation on a 16MHz Palm V andab out 1 secondfor data transmission if the throughput of a network is 8 kbps. The computation time can be improvedto 300 msec and the transmision time can also be reduced to 300 msec if caching is allowed.
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Zhu, F., Wong, D.S., Chan, A.H., Ye, R. (2002). Password Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RSA for Imbalanced Wireless Networks. In: Chan, A.H., Gligor, V. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2433. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45811-5_11
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