Regular ArticleIncentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents☆
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Quality incentive contracts considering asymmetric product manufacturability information: Piece rate vs. Tournament
2020, Computers and Industrial EngineeringCitation Excerpt :Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) find that the tournament contract can achieve the first-best expected utility if the number of agents is sufficiently large. Some papers (e.g., Najjar, 1997; Tsoulouhas, 1999; Marinakis & Tsoulouhas, 2013) examine the role of tournament contracts in alleviating the double moral hazard, where the principal’s hidden action acts as a common shock over the performance of all the agents. The relative performance used in a tournament helps to filter the impact of the principal’s hidden action.
Incentives and management styles
2015, International Journal of Industrial OrganizationCitation Excerpt :Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) argue that a simple linear contract can arise as an optimal outcome under two-sided incentives. Al-Najjar (1997) studies a situation in which a principal contributes her own effort along with multiple agents. Kim and Wang (1998) show that two-sided incentives make the optimal contract less sensitive to the potential outcomes than the one under the standard one-sided incentive.
Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
2007, Journal of Economic TheoryDo tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?
1999, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationLinear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard
1998, Journal of Economic TheoryPublic procurement policies of Nigeria and Ghana: an analysis of the administrative challenges in achieving value for money
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This is a revised version of an earlier paper titled “Incentive Contracts and Statistical Inference in Large Team Moral Hazards.” I thank Michael Riordan, Dilip Mookherjee, Doug Allen, John Ledyard, two referees of this journal, and seminar participants at Laval, Northwestern, Princeton, Penn, and MIT for their comments. This research was partially funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All remaining errors and shortcomings are my own.