This research analyzed the asymmetric information problems by using the individual reinsurance contract data, form a property and casualty insurance company in Taiwan, ceded by the commercial fire insurance contracts between year 2014 and 2017. The main purpose of this research is to find out whether the asymmetric information problems exist in the reinsurance market, and also to investigate whether the reinsurance company could use the public information of the insureds, which are listed, to mitigate the adverse selection problem. We use the two stage regression, similar to the method used by Dionne et al. (2001), to identify the information problems by observing the conditional correlation between reinsurance ceding portion and risk evaluated by claim probability and the amount of claim. We find that there is asymmetric information problem in reinsurance market. No matter what the risk is evaluated by, it will be significantly positive conditional correlation between ceding portion. We also find that there is significantly negative conditional correlation between ceding portion on primary contract and risk, evaluated by claim probability, on ceded contract as the insureds are listed, which means the reinsurer could mitigate the adverse selection through public information of the listed insureds, so we could confirm that there is more adverse selection problem when the insureds are unlisted.