Corruption and Decentralization

Carbonara, Emanuela (1999) Corruption and Decentralization. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 31. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4967. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (342). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper studies the effect of decentralization on corruption in a hierarchical organization, where decentralization is intended as the delegation of control power to lower levels in a hierarchy. Decentral- ization causes a loss in control to the higher levels, thus curbing their incentives to monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also lowers the expected gains from corruption as, following decentralization, the number of individuals who are in charge of a single decision is reduced. It is then more likely that corrupt agents are called to bear the consequences of their actions. Hence, decentralization, although creating agency problems inside an organization, can help in controlling corruption

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Carbonara, Emanuela
Parole chiave
Corruption, Delegation, Formal Authority, Real Authority.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
23 Mar 2016 08:02
Ultima modifica
23 Mar 2016 08:18
URI

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