Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium

Rossini, Gianpaolo (2004) Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4763. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (527). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We go through the decision to vertically integrate or outsource in an uncertain framework. We consider two different market strategies, price setting and quantity setting and two different vertical relationships: a Stackelberg one and a bargaining one. In the first scenario, with certainty, price and quantity settings are alike, while with uncertainty the ranking changes. If the bargaining framework is adopted instead, quantity setting under uncertainty leads to an asymmetric distribution of realized gains along the vertical chain.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Parole chiave
Vertical Integration, Uncertainty, Stackelberg, Bargaining
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Mar 2016 09:17
Ultima modifica
15 Mar 2016 09:17
URI

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