Formal Modeling and Verification of Security Property in Handel C Program

Formal Modeling and Verification of Security Property in Handel C Program

Yujian Fu, Jeffery Kulick, Lok K. Yan, Steven Drager
Copyright: © 2012 |Volume: 3 |Issue: 3 |Pages: 16
ISSN: 1947-3036|EISSN: 1947-3044|EISBN13: 9781466613997|DOI: 10.4018/jsse.2012070103
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MLA

Fu, Yujian, et al. "Formal Modeling and Verification of Security Property in Handel C Program." IJSSE vol.3, no.3 2012: pp.50-65. http://doi.org/10.4018/jsse.2012070103

APA

Fu, Y., Kulick, J., Yan, L. K., & Drager, S. (2012). Formal Modeling and Verification of Security Property in Handel C Program. International Journal of Secure Software Engineering (IJSSE), 3(3), 50-65. http://doi.org/10.4018/jsse.2012070103

Chicago

Fu, Yujian, et al. "Formal Modeling and Verification of Security Property in Handel C Program," International Journal of Secure Software Engineering (IJSSE) 3, no.3: 50-65. http://doi.org/10.4018/jsse.2012070103

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Abstract

Multi-million gate system-on-chip (SoC) designs easily fit into today’s Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). As FPGAs become more common in safety-critical and mission-critical systems, researchers and designers require information flow guarantees for the FPGAs. Tools for designing a secure system of chips (SOCs) using FPGAs and new techniques to manage and analyze the security properties precisely are desirable. In this work we propose a formal approach to model, analyze and verify a typical set of security properties – noninterference – of Handel C programs using Petri Nets and model checking. This paper presents a method to model Handel C programs using Predicate Transition Nets, a type of Petri Net, and define security properties on the model, plus a verification approach where security properties are checked. Three steps are used. First, a formal specification on the Handel C description using Petri Nets is extracted. Second, the dynamic noninterference properties with respect to the Handel C program statements are defined on the model. To assist in verification, a translation rule from the Petri Nets specification to the Maude programming language is also defined. Thus, the formal specification can be verified against the system properties using model checking. A case study of the pipeline multiplier is discussed to illustrate the concept and validate the approach.

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