Abstract
Self-discrepancy theory proposes that distinct relations among different self-state representations (e.g., the actual, ideal, ought, and can selves) can produce distress. Like cybernetic theory, it assumes that people self-regulate through a discrepancy-reducing feedback process. Like cognitive neuroscience theory, it assumes that the internal representations are interconnected such that activation of one element can initiate the running off of established patterns. Like Gestalt psychology, it assumes that each pattern has a meaning and importance that is not deducible from knowledge of the isolated elements. Together, these assumptions yield predictions that pose challenges for simple theories of knowledge representation. Evidence for two such predictions is presented: (1) Exposure to positive input can produce distress; and (2) the same belief can produce more distress when combined with a positive than with a negative belief.
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Higgins, E.T. Self-state representations: Patterns of interconnected beliefs with specific holistic meanings and importance. Bull. Psychon. Soc. 28, 248–253 (1990). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03334017
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03334017