Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that intuitive perceptions of certainty regarding a focal outcome are sensitive to variations in how evidence supporting nonfocal alternatives is distributed, even when such variations have no bearing on objective probability. We investigated thisalternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm in which participants made likelihood judgments on the basis of their memory for past observations of relevant outcomes. In Experiment 1, a manipulation of evidence (observed frequencies) across alternative outcomes influenced not only intuitive certainty estimates about a focal outcome but also numeric subjective probabilities. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that these effects were attributable to the influence of information loss on frequency estimations. The findings were consistent with the heuristic comparison account, which suggests that the judged likelihood of a focal outcome will be disproportionately influenced by the strength (frequency) of the strongest alternative outcome.
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This work was supported by Grant SES 99-11245 from the National Science Foundation.
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Windschitl, P.D., Young, M.E. & Jenson, M.E. Likelihood judgment based on previously observed outcomes: the alternative-outcomes effect in a learning paradigm. Memory & Cognition 30, 469–477 (2002). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03194947
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03194947