Abstract
Described in this paper is a research paradigm, written as a set of computer programs, to conduct on-line bargaining and coalition formation experiments within the characteristic function game framework. The structure of the paradigm is outlined, an example is presented and discussed, and further extensions of the program are briefly discussed.
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This research has been supported in part by PHS Grant MH-10006 from the National Institute of Mental Health and in part by University Science Development Program Grant GU-2059 from the National Science Foundation. The address on which the paper is based, was delivered by the senior author.
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Rapoport, A., Kahan, J.P. Computer controlled research on bargaining and coalition formation. Behavior Research Methods & Instrumentation 6, 87–93 (1974). https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03200307
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03200307