Authors:	Haug, Oliver Jung, Marius F.
Title:	Are there counterexamples to the immunity principle? : Some restrictions and clarifications ; a commentary on Caleb Liang
Online publication date:	24-Oct-2016
Year of first publication:	2015
Language:	english
Abstract:	Our commentary focuses on the sense of experiential ownership and its implications for the Immunity Principle. In general we think that Liang elaborates the self-as-object and the self-as-subject in an interesting and refreshing way. Nevertheless, there are some problems that we want to address. (1) First, we argue that the sense of experiential ownership cannot misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership. (2) Second, we argue that neither the sense of experiential ownership in particular nor phenomenal states in general are eligible for identity judgments. (3) Then we claim that the two alleged counterexamples actually do not provide any valid argument against IEM. (4) We close by evaluating whether it makes sense to talk about the Immunity Principle as a non-trivial property, or whether the relevant properties are just mispredication or misguided reference.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-656
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550005
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	In Copyright
Information on rights of use:	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation:	Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	Kap. 24(C)
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2015
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570467
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958570467
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen