Authors:	Newen, Albert
Title:	A multiplicity view for social cognition : defending a coherent framework ; a reply to Lisa Quadt
Online publication date:	21-Oct-2016
Year of first publication:	2015
Language:	english
Abstract:	Lisa Quadt’s commentary focuses on my theory about the multiple epistemic strategies humans use to receive information about one other’s mental phenomena. She develops a principle worry about the theory’s underlying metaphysical foundations, arguing that I am committed to an incoherent metaphysical framework. In this reply, I show that I am not committed to the position she attributes to me and I outline an alternative framework that is my actual background view. I illustrate this framework by discussing emotions and argue that emotions are individuated as integrated patterns of characteristic features. This enables me to combine a representational account of emotions with a theory of direct perception of basic emotions as well as with an understanding of some emotions relying on theory-based inferences. Thus, I have a coherent metaphysics. Finally, I show that the alternative suggested by Quadt has its own problems.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-284
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-549893
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	In Copyright
Information on rights of use:	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation:	Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	Kap. 26(R)
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2015
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571167
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958571167
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen