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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The use of traditional symbols by leaders of newly independent states to achieve consensus in their respective political communities is not unusual these days. The professed aspiration of these leaders to modernize their societies does not keep them from manipulating traditional symbols for the maintenance of order in a period of troubled transition. Often the student of politics in these states finds that formal changes in the institutions and functions of the state and government do not necessarily reflect or imply serious structural and conceptual changes. Nor do they necessarily affect appreciably the concept, use, or allocation of power.
When members of the military establishment acceded to political power in some Middle Eastern states in the past decade, they announced their intention to “modernize” their societies. This aspiration raises a variety of questions for the student of Middle Eastern politics. What political ideology, order, and system was the new leadership proposing? The desire to “modernize” implied that their societies were still bound in a complex of traditional relationships and structures. The attitudes of the new military leaders, who claim to desire a departure from the past in national development, toward the Islamic religious-traditional background of society should be a primary factor in any analysis of the orientation of this new leadership.
This article draws on my forthcoming book, The Army and Politics in the United Arab Republic to be published by the Indiana University Press. I am grateful for support received from the Rockefeller Foundation and S.S.R.C.
1 The struggle between the Free Officers and the Supreme Council of the Muslim Brotherhood had been going on since August 1952, when the latter organization insisted upon a share in government. By the autumn of 1954, the Free Officers in power were well on their way to out-lawing the Brotherhood. It had been implicated in the Naguib-Nasser controversy of February-March 1954 on the side of General Naguib.
2 See press interview with Anwar es-Sadat, Secretary-General of the Islamic Congress, in al-Ahram, 6 July 1956.
3 See my “Recent Developments in Islam,” in Tensions in the Middle East, ed. Thayer, Philip W. (Baltimore, 1958), pp. 165–180 Google Scholar.
4 Princeton University Press, 1957.
5 See Vatikiotis, P. J., The Fatimid Theory of the State (Lahore, 1957)Google Scholar.
6 See, for example, el-Bazzaz, Abder Rahman, “Islam and Arab Nationalism,” in Die Welt des Islams (1954), Parts 3–4, pp. 210–218 Google Scholar, where he asserts that “Arab nationalism devoid of the spirit of Islam is like a body without a soul.” But compare this view with al-Husri, Sati‘, Al-‘uruba awwalan (Beirut, 1955)Google Scholar, who tries to make a case for a secular theory of Arab Nationalism.
7 See the excellent study by Ammar, Hamed, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village (London, 1954), esp. pp. 214–237 Google Scholar.
8 Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity (Cambridge, Mass. 1959)Google Scholar.
9 See especially the efforts of the Ministry of National Guidance and Culture to dignify holy feasts, such as the Prophet's Birthday (mulid en-nabi), by curbing the mass celebrations of tariqas. See a special report to the press by former minister Fathi Radwan in al-Ahram, 25 September 1958.
10 Al-Ahram, 27 September 1959.
11 The privileged position of Egypt was argued as early as 1956 by such an eminent advocate of Arab Unity as Michel Aflaq, when he said that, in spite of Syria's earlier leadership in the cause of Arab Unity, certain conditions obtaining in Egypt—greater political independence, a greater awareness of popular needs and aspirations on the part of the Army rulers—rendered her better suited to lead the cause. He contended further that the Arab disaster in Palestine caused Egypt to abandon her old isolationism. See Maarakat al-masir al-wahid (Beirut, 1958), especially pp. 66–110 Google Scholar. The material base for her new leadership may have been strengthened by her greater exposure to allied troop and supply movements during World War II.
12 Reported in al-Ahram, 10 March 1957.
13 See especially the volume by Darwaza, Muhammad Izzat, Al-wahda'l-‘arabiyya [Arab Unity] (Beirut, 1957)Google Scholar.
14 Galal al-Hamamsi, a leading Arab journalist can thus seriously assert that Arabism is the highest aspiration of all Arabs, as well as of their respective governments. By Arabism he means its ultimate form and structure: Arab Unity. At one point, though, this journalist glibly compared the period 1860–1865 in American history to the present stage of evolution of the Arab states. Interview, October 1958.
15 The Baath Party in Syria was instrumental in bringing about union between Damascus and Cairo; one of their fundamental party objectives was Arab Unity. After a brief participation in both the Central Government of the U.A.R. and the Executive Cabinet for the Syrian Region (February 1958-December 1959), most of the Baathist leaders in these positions have either resigned or been ousted from office, so that by July 1960 the Central Government of the U.A.R. had come under almost completely Egyptian leadership.
16 E.g., the obvious chasm separating the political orientations and interests of North African Arab rulers (Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya) from those of the United Arab Republic on the one hand, or the Republic of Iraq on the other.
17 Thus, an Arab anywhere in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq has no difficulty in accepting Arabism readily if it is equated or linked with Islam. It is not at all certain, however, that he would accept it enthusiastically if it were couched in terms of U.A.R.-led and interpreted Arabism, or Saudi Arabian- inspired Arabism.
