이 글은 제20대 국회의원 선거를 앞두고 이루어진 준연동형 선거제도 개혁을 개혁의 주체, 목적 그리고 정치적 결과의 차원에서 분석하고 평가하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 분석 결과 준연동형 선거제도 개혁은 다음과 같은 특징을 나타냈다. 먼저, 이번 선거제도 개혁은 선거제도의 비례성(proportionality) 증진에만 초점을 맞추어서 진행되었다. 둘째, 선거제도 개혁과정에서 집권 민주당과 소수 야당의 연합이 중심적인 역할을 하였다. 제1야당(자유 한국당)은 준연동형 선거제도 개혁을 처음부터 적극 반대하였으며 입법화 과정에서 민주당+소수 야당 연합과 물리적으로 충돌하였다. 또한 정당 간 연합에 의해서 권력극대화를 목적으로 진행된 이번 선거제도 개혁에서 주권자인 시민들은 의미 있는 역할을 하지 못했다. 마지막으로. 준 연동형 선거제도가 처음 적용된 제21대 국회의원 선거 결과 개혁의 목적과는 달리 지역구와 비례대표의 불비례성이 오히려 증가하였다.
준연동형 선거제도 개혁이 목적을 달성하지 못한 가장 중요한 이유는 선거 캠페인 과정에서 연동형 비례대표제를 실험했던 나라들(알바니아, 레소토, 베네주엘라)이 경험한 것처럼 거대 양당이 의석 극대화를 위해서 위성정당을 창당하고 지지자들의 집합적 전략투표를 동원한 때문이었다. 또한, 비례대표 의석(47석)이 선거제도 개혁에도 불구하고 변화되지 않았기 때문이다.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the quasi-mixed member proportional electoral system reform in terms of its actors, goals, and political consequences. The analysis of this study confirms the main characteristics of the process and consequences of the electoral reform. First, the primary purpose of the electoral reform focuses solely on the improvement of the electoral system's proportionality. Second, during the reform process, the political coalition between the incumbent party (Democratic Party) and small opposition parties without the largest opposition party (Liberal Korea Party) played significant roles. The largest opposition party actively opposed the electoral reform to introduce MMP style new system and physically collided with the coalition during electoral reform. Also, in the electoral reform process, which aimed at maximizing power by the alliance between the incumbent and other small opposition parties, the sovereign citizens did not play a meaningful role. Finally, as a result of the 21st National Assembly Election applied with the new electoral system, contrary to the purpose of the electoral reform, the disproportionality somewhat deteriorated. The reason why the electoral reform failed to achieve its objectives is that major two parties manipulated the new electoral system by launching the satellite party for competition at the party-list tier and mobilize the supporter's collective strategic voting to maximize electoral seats. This strategy already utilized in other countries whose electoral system was MMP, such as Albania. Lesotho and Venezuela. Also, small number of seat in the proportional tier was not increased.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the quasi-mixed member proportional electoral system reform in terms of its actors, goals, and political consequences. The analysis of this study confirms the main characteristics of the process and consequences of the electoral reform. First, the primary purpose of the electoral reform focuses solely on the improvement of the electoral system's proportionality. Second, during the reform process, the political coalition between the incumbent party (Democratic Party) and small opposition parties without the largest opposition party (Liberal Korea Party) played significant roles. The largest opposition party actively opposed the electoral reform to introduce MMP style new system and physically collided with the coalition during electoral reform. Also, in the electoral reform process, which aimed at maximizing power by the alliance between the incumbent and other small opposition parties, the sovereign citizens did not play a meaningful role. Finally, as a result of the 21st National Assembly Election applied with the new electoral system, contrary to the purpose of the electoral reform, the disproportionality somewhat deteriorated. The reason why the electoral reform failed to achieve its objectives is that major two parties manipulated the new electoral system by launching the satellite party for competition at the party-list tier and mobilize the supporter's collective strategic voting to maximize electoral seats. This strategy already utilized in other countries whose electoral system was MMP, such as Albania. Lesotho and Venezuela. Also, small number of seat in the proportional tier was not increased.
