Unities of the Self: From Kant to Locke

Abstract

This paper re-evaluates the relation between Kant and some of the most important philosophers traditionally labelled ‘empiricists’ on the topic of the unity of the self. Although Kant was familiar with at least some of the writings of the philosophers dealt with here, this paper’s concern is not with the question of influence or development, but with systematic aspects of Kant’s relation to the empiricist tradition. It is argued that Kant’s relationship to empiricist thought on this issue is more complex than one might be tempted to think. There are several different notions of unity within the empiricist tradition. Moreover, the philosophers considered here, thinkers as diverse as Locke, Condillac, Hume, Feder, Priestley, Reid and Tetens, work with more than one notion of the unity of the self, as does Kant. Locke’s contribution at the beginning of early modern thought about unity turns out to be closer to Kant’s account than that of other empiricists in that Kant develops further the Lockean idea of consciousness as a unifying activity. In general terms Kant’s account can be seen as continuous with the debate about unity among empiricist thinkers, it does not constitute a simple break with that tradition.