The Journal of Japanese Studies

T. J. Pempel's new book is based on his observation of the region for many decades as well as wide reading of other studies published in English during that time. It can be classified within comparative political economy, which has been one of Pempel's specialties, but at the same time the study has substantial historical depth; it concentrates on the long trajectories of post-World War II history, touches relatively lightly on recent matters, and refrains from adventurous predictions about the future.

As the title suggests, the book is constructed around the concept of regime. In the beginning of the book, it appears as a theoretically rigorous concept grounded on references to Max Weber, Antonio Gramsci, and more recent authors. For Pempel, a regime is composed of state institutions, socioeconomic conditions, and external influences. The main external influence is of course the United States together with international secondary institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, while the East Asian states form an external environment for each other. A related concept is the economic policy paradigm that guides practical policy creation in the respective countries. These two concepts then reflect the national gestalt or weltanschauung of the different states (pp. 3–12). However, Pempel does not analyze the whole region but concentrates on only ten bigger states.

The author names three distinctive regime types: the developmental regimes of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; the ersatz developmental regimes of Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia; and finally, the rapacious regimes of [End Page 256] North Korea, Myanmar, and the Philippines during the Ferdinand Marcos administration in 1965–86. They are "the good, the not so good, and the ugly" types of heroes and villains of the story. Later, China is also added as an amalgamation of all three regime types.

Pempel's argument is that the developmental regimes benefited from strong and modern state institutions whose grounds were laid during the Japanese empire, leading in the postwar period to efficient and mercantilist state-guided economic policymaking, rapid educational and technological upgrading, fast economic growth, affluent societies, and increasing democratization over the decades. The ersatz developmental regimes engaged in the building of their state institutions after World War II, but they were hampered by internal ethnic and political cleavages, a strong role of primary natural resources in their economic structure, dependence on foreign capital, and less rapid educational and technological upgrading. They were thus developing along with the general growth wave in East Asia, but at the societal level their achievements have thus far not been as high as in the developmental regimes. The rapacious regimes represent cases of dictatorial rule, serious longstanding internal and/or external conflict, enrichment of a small elite at the expense of the whole population, and a lack of notable achievements in any fields of development.

In many ways, China might fit well with the three developmental regimes, as its efforts at modern state building already stretch longer than a century and because it has been successful in so many fields during the latter half of that century, but Pempel keeps it as a separate category. One might also debate the categorization of North Korea. Undeniably, it is a rapacious regime in the economic and political senses, but its advances in military technology all the way to nuclear weapons and space satellites signify systemic state efficiency. In this sense it resembles the three effective developmental regimes, though Pempel does not reach this conclusion.

A problem with the concept of regime is that it is simultaneously both tight and loose. It is often used as a synonym for the concept of the state in its governance aspects, but in regional studies it usually has wider systemic meanings. In Pempel's usage, the concept usually corresponds with states, but his argumentation also gives the impression of specific interactive systems. This is especially true in...