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Annual Review of Economics

Volume 14, 2022

The Affordable Care Act After a Decade: Industrial Organization of the Insurance Exchanges

Abstract

The regulated insurance exchanges set up in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were designed to deliver affordable, efficient health coverage through private insurers. It is crucial to study the complex industrial organization (IO) of these exchanges in order to assess their impacts during the first decade of the ACA and to project their effects going forward. We revisit the inherent market failures in health care markets that necessitate key ACA exchange regulations and investigate whether they have succeeded in their goals of expanding coverage, creating robust marketplaces, providing product variety, and generating innovation in health care delivery. We discuss empirical IO research to date and also highlight shortcomings in the existing research that can be addressed moving forward. We conclude with a discussion of IO research-based policy lessons for the ACA exchanges and, more generally, for managed competition of private insurance in health care.

Keyword(s): adverse selection, Affordable Care Act, health insurance, JEL D81, JEL G22, JEL I13, managed competition, moral hazard, subsidies
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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-economics-051420-114714
2022-08-12
2024-04-25
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