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Security Analysis of Devolo HomePlug Devices

Published:25 March 2019Publication History

ABSTRACT

Vulnerabilities in smart devices often are particular severe from a privacy point of view. If these devices form central components of the underlying infrastructure, such as Wifi repeaters, even an entire network may be compromised. The devastating effects of such a compromise recently became evident in light of the Mirai botnet. In this paper, we conduct a thorough security analysis of so-called HomePlug devices, which are used to establish network communication over power lines. We identify multiple security issues and find that hundreds of vulnerable devices are openly connected to the Internet across Europe. 87 % run an outdated firmware, showing the deficiency of manual updates in comparison to automatic ones. However, even the default configurations of updated devices lack basic security mechanisms.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    EuroSec '19: Proceedings of the 12th European Workshop on Systems Security
    March 2019
    59 pages
    ISBN:9781450362740
    DOI:10.1145/3301417

    Copyright © 2019 ACM

    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 25 March 2019

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    • research-article
    • Research
    • Refereed limited

    Acceptance Rates

    EuroSec '19 Paper Acceptance Rate9of25submissions,36%Overall Acceptance Rate47of113submissions,42%

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