skip to main content
10.1145/2940716.2940724acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesecConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article
Public Access
Best Paper

Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?

Published:21 July 2016Publication History

ABSTRACT

What is a fair way to assign rooms to several housemates, and divide the rent between them? This is not just a theoretical question: many people have used the Spliddit website to obtain envy-free solutions to rent division instances. But envy freeness, in and of itself, is insufficient to guarantee outcomes that people view as intuitive and acceptable. We therefore focus on solutions that optimize a criterion of social justice, subject to the envy freeness constraint, in order to pinpoint the ``fairest'' solutions. We develop a general algorithmic framework that enables the computation of such solutions in polynomial time. We then study the relations between natural optimization objectives, and identify the maximin solution, which maximizes the minimum utility subject to envy freeness, as the most attractive. We demonstrate, in theory and using experiments on real data from Spliddit, that the maximin solution gives rise to significant gains in terms of our optimization objectives. Finally, a user study with Spliddit users as subjects demonstrates that people find the maximin solution to be significantly fairer than arbitrary envy-free solutions; this user study is unprecedented in that it asks people about their real-world rent division instances. Based on these results, the maximin solution has been deployed on Spliddit since April 2015.

References

  1. A. Abdulkadirouglu, T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver. 2004. Room assignment-rent division: A market approach. Social Choice and Welfare 22, 3 (2004), 515--538.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  2. M. Aleksandrov, H. Aziz, S. Gaspers, and T. Walsh. 2015. Online fair division: Analysing a food bank problem. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI). 2540--2546. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  3. A. Alkan, G. Demange, and D. Gale. 1991. Fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice. Econometrica 59, 4 (1991), 1023--1039.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  4. E. Aragones. 1995. A derivation of the money Rawlsian solution. Social Choice and Welfare 12 (1995), 267--276.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  5. S. J. Brams and D. M. Kilgour. 2001. Competitive fair division. Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001), 418--443.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  6. N. Dupuis-Roy and F. Gosselin. 2011. The simpler, the better: A new challenge for fair-division theory. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci). 3229--3234.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  7. D. Foley. 1967. Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economics Essays 7 (1967), 45--98.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  8. J. Goldman and A. D. Procaccia. 2014. Spliddit: Unleashing fair division algorithms. SIGecom Exchanges 13, 2 (2014), 41--46. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  9. J. R. Green and J.-J. Laffont. 1979. Incentives in Public Decision Making. North Holland.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  10. C.-J. Haake, M. G. Raith, and F. E. Su. 2002. Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002), 723--749.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  11. D. K. Herreiner and C. D. Puppe. 2009. Envy freeness in experimental fair division problems. Theory and decision 67, 1 (2009), 65--100.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  12. D. K. Herreiner and C. D. Puppe. 2010. Inequality aversion and efficiency with ordinal and cardinal social preferences--an experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 76, 2 (2010), 238--253.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  13. F. Klijn. 2000. An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money. Social Choice and Welfare 17 (2000), 201--215.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  14. S. Kohler. 2013. Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics 1, 6 (2013), 31--41.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  15. D. Kurokawa, A. D. Procaccia, and N. Shah. 2015. Leximin allocations in the real world. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC). 345--362. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  16. A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  17. A. D. Procaccia and J. Wang. 2014. Fair enough: Guaranteeing approximate maximin shares. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC). 675--692. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  18. G. Schneider and U.S. Kramer. 2004. The limitations of fair division: An experimental evaluation of three procedures. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, 4 (2004), 506--524.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  19. F. E. Su. 1999. Rental harmony: Sperner's lemma in fair division. American Mathematical Monthly 106, 10 (1999), 930--942.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref
  20. L.-G. Svensson. 1983. Large indivisibles: An analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness. Econometrica 51, 4 (1983), 939--954.Google ScholarGoogle ScholarCross RefCross Ref

Index Terms

  1. Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?

        Recommendations

        Comments

        Login options

        Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

        Sign in
        • Published in

          cover image ACM Conferences
          EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
          July 2016
          874 pages
          ISBN:9781450339360
          DOI:10.1145/2940716

          Copyright © 2016 ACM

          Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

          Publisher

          Association for Computing Machinery

          New York, NY, United States

          Publication History

          • Published: 21 July 2016

          Permissions

          Request permissions about this article.

          Request Permissions

          Check for updates

          Qualifiers

          • research-article

          Acceptance Rates

          EC '16 Paper Acceptance Rate80of242submissions,33%Overall Acceptance Rate664of2,389submissions,28%

          Upcoming Conference

          EC '24
          The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
          July 8 - 11, 2024
          New Haven , CT , USA

        PDF Format

        View or Download as a PDF file.

        PDF

        eReader

        View online with eReader.

        eReader