Abstract
A concept of k-stable alternatives is introduced. Relationship of classes of k-stable alternatives with dominant, uncovered and weakly stable sets is established.
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Published in Russian in Doklady Akademii Nauk, 2009, Vol. 426, No. 3, pp. 318–320.
The article was translated by the authors.
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Aleskerov, F.T., Subochev, A.N. On stable solutions to the Ordinal Social Choice problem. Dokl. Math. 79, 437–439 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562409030375
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064562409030375