INTRODUCTION

The policy of the great powers, the United States, the Russian Federation, and China, in the Middle East remains the focus of the expert community both in Russia and abroad. Thus, the events in Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 2021, for obvious reasons, aroused the keenest interest among the American political and academic elite. According to one of the most authoritative American international experts, W. Mead [8], no one, neither friends nor opponents of the United States, expected such a rapid collapse of the pro-American Afghan ruling regime as a result of the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. Hence, the question: is the American ruling class generally capable of pursuing a consistent and effective foreign policy in the region of the Near and Middle East? The consequences of the Afghan failure for the ideology of American foreign policy did not pass by the attention of American experts. According to Professor J. Munch at Johns Hopkins University, leaving Afghanistan had disastrous consequences for the credibility of the West, whose promises to protect the security of allies threatened by authoritarian competitors such as Russia and China will now sound even more false (J. Mounk, 2021). In general, American international experts believe that the US defeat in Afghanistan will have far-reaching consequences for the American military–political strategy in the Middle East.

Among Russian experts on the Middle East, there is a widespread point of view that the gradual weakening of American positions in the region is a long-term trend, and it originated long before the tragic events in Afghanistan in 2021. Thus, researchers of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations O.I. Rebro and M.A. Suchkov state that even President B. Obama proclaimed a course towards a “pivot to Asia,” a policy of gradually transferring foreign policy resources to the Asia–Pacific (Indo–Pacific) region while reducing the American presence in the Middle East and Europe. This course was continued by D. Trump (O.I. Rebro and M.A. Suchkov, 2021, p. 23).

In the collective monograph of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations staff, the coauthors of which are prominent orientalists such as V.V. Naumkin, V.A. Kuznetsov, and I.D. Zvyagelskaya, it is noted that the trend towards the democratization of the “Greater Middle East” following the American model has largely become marginalized. In the wake of the growth of anti-American sentiment in the region and the identification of US policy with the catastrophic military campaign in Iraq, “democracy promotion” is becoming less and less noticeable in the strategic planning of official Washington (Middle East: Politics and Identity, 2020, p. 287).

American and Russian experts agree that the US position in the Middle East is gradually weakening, and this is a long-term trend. At the same time, the positions of the Russian Federation and China have been strengthening in the region in recent years. Russian researcher V.I. Bartenev states that in the 2010s, the Russian Federation made a swift and rather effective return to the Middle East, although so far it has been using international aid instruments on an incomparably smaller scale than the United States, the EU countries, Turkey, or the monarchies of the Persian Gulf (V.I. Bartenev, 2020, p. 106). According to R. Mamedov, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, the reduction of the American presence in the Middle East coincided with the increasing involvement of Russia and China in the processes taking place in the region there. In this regard, R. Mamedov draws attention to the fact that, in recent years, China has become the main investor for the countries of the region, surpassing the United States in this indicator (R. Mamedov, 2018).

AMERICAN POLITICAL STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION

Both Russian and foreign experts on the Middle East have drawn an unambiguous conclusion about the decline in the political commitments of the United States here in recent years. The successive administrations of B. Obama, D. Trump, and J. Biden, with all the party-political differences and personal hostility of these US presidents, are nevertheless forced to pursue a Middle East policy that is characterized by a fairly high degree of continuity in the issue about the need to limit the American military presence in the Middle East. For example, over the past 12 years, the United States has withdrawn its armed forces from Afghanistan and minimized its presence in Iraq and Syria. Washington also rejected the idea of direct American armed intervention in the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts.

More importantly, the American leadership has recently made attempts to provide an ideological justification for reducing the American presence in the Middle East region and in the world as a whole. D. Trump’s idea to “make America great again” and J. Biden’s concept of “foreign policy for the middle class” provide for the cessation or, in any case, the reduction to a minimum of American armed interference in the affairs of the Middle East (J. Mounk, 2021). Speaking in connection with the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, J. Biden said that the United States was renouncing endless wars in the name of “nation-building” and “expanding democracy.” Instead, according to the American president, the United States should focus on confronting its “true strategic competitors,” China and Russia [6].

Now that the task of bringing freedom to the peoples of the Middle East through “humanitarian interventions” no longer seems relevant, Washington can pay more attention to other problems and challenges that the United States faces in the region. And here it is also appropriate to pay attention to the continuity of the American Middle East policy: even in the directive documents of the D. Trump administration, Russia and China were named the main opponents of America, including in the Middle East. For all the criticism of the policies of its predecessor, the Biden administration adheres to the same approaches. Thus, the National Security Strategy, approved by President D. Trump in December 2017 (NSC-2017), stated the following: “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo–Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders” [5, p. 25]. In principle, the same is stated in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance signed by President Biden in early March 2021: “China <…> has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system. Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to <…> prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world” [4, p. 8].

The American military is also expressing its concern about the active penetration of China and Russia into the Middle East region. Thus, speaking before the Senate Committee on Armed Forces Affairs, the commander of the Central Command (CENTCOM) of the US Armed Forces, General C. McKenzie, drew attention to the active economic penetration of the PRC into the region of the Near and Middle East, including within the framework of the Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative. The general was particularly alarmed by the recent Iranian–Chinese agreement on economic cooperation for a period of 25 years, under which China will invest in the economy and infrastructure of Iran in exchange for discounts on Iranian oil. The agreement provides for cooperation between these two countries in the military sphere, which cannot but undermine the American positions in the Iranian direction.

The direct challenge to the United States, according to the General, is the presence of Russia in Syria, which seeks to undermine the US military and political positions in the region. In close proximity to the US military, he said, Moscow received not only an ice-free base in Tartus for its navy, but also a testing ground for new fifth-generation capabilities, technologies and equipment used for electronic warfare, ABM, UAV and information operations. Moreover, Russia will continue to position itself as an alternative to the West, offering its mediation and military experience in regional conflicts, selling weapons without end-use restrictions, and participating in regional and multilateral organizations and military exercises. At the same time, in some regions of the CENTCOM area of responsibility (for example, in Central Asia), Russia and China, according to General McKenzie, already have stronger economic and military–political positions than the United States. The CENTCOM Commander recommends that the United States intensify its competition with Moscow and Beijing for influence in Central Asia by offering American assistance to the countries of the subregion in securing borders, combating drugs, combating terrorism, and building defense institutions [7, pp. 15–16].

However, these optimistic calculations to undermine the influence of the Russian Federation and China were made even before the start of the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. In the spring of 2021, Washington expected that the regime of Afghan President A. Ghani would last 1–2 years after the US military left the country [9].

Everything, however, went completely wrong. The Afghan catastrophe has already affected the positions of the United States of America in the Middle East region and in the world. One of the immediate consequences of this catastrophe was the decision of the SCO summit (Dushanbe, September 2021) to start the procedure for admitting Iran to this organization. This is the strongest blow to the American policy of isolating Iran in the international arena.

Simultaneously with the decline in the military and political influence of the United States in the Middle East region, there is also an economic “undocking” of the United States and the Middle Eastern states. The “Shale Revolution” allowed the United States to become the world leader in oil production, thereby dramatically reducing its dependence on oil supplies from the Middle East. Having increased its own oil production, the United States has significantly reduced oil imports from the Middle East. If in 2000 the share of Middle Eastern oil in American oil imports was 22.7%, in 2020 it was 9.8% [10].

At present, the dependence of the American economy on the situation with oil production in the countries of the Middle East is not at all the same as it was two decades ago, and this cannot but affect American policy in the region. In the NSC-2017, in the section devoted to the Middle East, a lot was said about the threat from radical Islamism and about the Iranian threat, but nothing was said about the prospects for US economic cooperation with the countries of the region (at the same time, “economic stagnation” and the need for reforms in the Middle Eastern states was noted) [5, pp. 48–50].

Accordingly, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of the Biden administration indicated both the “cast-iron” American support for Israel, and the opposition to “Iranian aggression,” and the desire to “resolve armed conflicts” in the region, but not a word about economic cooperation with countries of the Middle East. It is obvious that both the American ruling circles and the American business community currently have other foreign economic priorities.

Thus, at present, the United States has ceded its status as a major trading partner to China and, apparently, in the political and business communities of the country, this circumstance is not considered as a serious challenge to national interests. At the same time, they cannot afford to forget about the existence of the Middle East: the terrorist threat continues to emanate from the region.

According to General McKenzie, Iran is considered as the main threat to American interests and the interests of partners and allies of the United States in the Middle East region. The second direction of CENTCOM’s efforts is terrorist groups operating in the region (such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, etc.). In third place among the challenges to US security in the Middle East is, according to American estimates, long-term strategic competition with China, combined with opposition from Russia: “These states, each of which pursues its own specific goals, use different approaches. Russia plays the role of a hindrance to the US, using military means, influence operations, and activities in the gray zone <…>. China uses mainly economic means to <…> ensure vital energy supply and trade routes” [7, pp. 4–5].

RUSSIA’S POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE REGION

Thanks to Russia’s active foreign policy in the Middle East, it managed to return to the global arena in the shortest historical period as one of the leading players here and win the authority of the Middle Eastern states. For this, Moscow actively used a set of diplomatic, military, and other methods.

The doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation note the importance of the Middle East region for its foreign policy. Thus, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by the President on November 30, 2016, states that “Russia will continue to make a significant contribution to stabilizing the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, support collective efforts aimed at neutralizing threats emanating from international terrorist groups, to pursue a consistent policy of political and diplomatic settlement of conflicts in the states of this region on the basis of respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and the right to determine their own destiny without outside interference. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a member of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators, Russia will continue to make efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive, just, and long-term settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict in all its aspects on an international legal basis” [2].

In accordance with these guidelines, at the end of January 2020, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, proposed holding a ministerial meeting on a Middle East settlement with the participation of Israel and Palestine. At the same time, he noted that Saudi Arabia should also be invited to this meeting as the author of the Arab peace initiative. In other words, Moscow’s main goal in the Middle East in the near future is to secure for Russia the role of a significant external force in one of the most unstable regions of the world.

Deputy Director of the Department for the Middle East and North Africa of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A. Skosyrev, speaking at the Valdai Club in February 2021, noted that “Russia proceeds from the need to promote the settlement of all conflicts in the Middle East space exclusively by political diplomatic methods through a constructive dialogue without discrimination against individual parties, also under the auspices of the UN and with the involvement of key regional organizations, primarily the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Russia’s second task is to prevent the emergence of new dangerous military crises in the Middle East. The third task is to turn the Middle East into a region of peace, good neighborliness, and mutually beneficial cooperation” [1].

In addition, Russia is vigorously developing multifaceted cooperation with the states of the region in the economic and humanitarian spheres, in military–technical cooperation, and in other areas of interaction on the principles of mutual consideration of interests, respect, and trust. Fighting terrorist groups active in the Middle East remains an important task.

As for trade and economic cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, the Russian Federation is faced with the task of expanding its presence in the regional markets for weapons, nuclear fuel, oil and gas, and food, attracting investments from the Persian Gulf countries and maintaining energy prices by coordinating actions with key suppliers of oil and gas in these OPEC countries.

It is already the case that Russia is the main exporter of grain to Egypt and one of the largest suppliers of defense products to the region. Thus, according to SIPRI, Russia accounted for 11% of all weapons imported by the countries of the Middle East from 2015 to 2019 [11, pp. 355–356].

In addition, Rosatom is building the Akkuyu nuclear power plant for Turkey, and it has projects in Jordan as well. The Russian oil company Lukoil is actively working in Iraq. Consequently, Moscow’s policy and strategy in the Middle East is based on taking into account the geopolitical and economic interests of Russia and on incentives that contribute to their implementation, which is eloquently evidenced by illustrative data (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1.
figure 1

Valdai International Discussion Club. The main tasks and priorities of Russia’s policy in the Middle East. February 19, 2018. Available at https://ru.valdaiclub.com/multimedia/infographics/politiki-rossii-blizhniy-vostok/. Cited August 15, 2021.

Full size image

In the context of the events taking place in the region, the factor of Russia’s internal stability is also important for Moscow, given that 12% of the country’s population professes Islam (mainly residents of Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan). At the same time, the Russian Federation has a significant number of labor migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan [D. Trenin, 2016]. It should be added to this that if the Taliban fighters, who seized power in Afghanistan in August 2021, invade the territory of the Central Asian countries, then a wave of refugees from there may overwhelm Russia, and therefore the number of Muslims in its regions with predominantly non-Islamic population will gradually increase. That is why Russia’s Middle East policy must also be viewed through Moscow’s relationship with the Islamic community.

During the Second Chechen campaign (1999–2009), Russia’s first period of rapprochement with the Islamic world took place. It is to this period that the speech of V.V. Putin at the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the receipt by the Russian Federation of the observer status in this structure refer. The second phase of this rapprochement is taking place today. Its most important intermediate result was the strengthening of Russia’s positions in the Syrian Arab Republic. This allowed Moscow to launch the format of negotiations in Astana with Iran and Turkey and bring its relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which are interested in stabilizing the situation in the region, to a new stage of interaction [12].

At the same time, Moscow’s military policy in Syria significantly increased Russia’s military-strategic weight in the Middle East, because it directly intervened in the conflict when there was a threat of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad and the fall of Damascus under the control of the Islamic State (ISIS). The victory of Islamic extremists in this country could lead to a serious increase in their support throughout the Islamic world, including in the Central Asian region and among the Muslim population of Russia. Therefore, Moscow has adopted a sensible, but at the same time risky strategy in Syria. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation conducted military operations abroad, mainly from the sea and from the air, and together with Turkey and Iran helped Damascus to cope with the separatists, thereby turning Syria into a geopolitical stronghold of the Russian Federation in the region. Moscow managed to agree with Ankara and Tehran on their joint actions in this country. Evidence of this is the negotiations in 2020 in Sochi between V. Putin, R. Erdogan, and H. Rouhani. There, the leaders of the three states discussed the situation in the Middle East, as a result of which the President of the Russian Federation declared that the war in Syria can be considered actually completed [13]. At first glance, it seemed that unanimity reigned at the Sochi talks, but in fact, each of the participants played his own “Middle East card.” For example, the Russian president defended the interests of the Russian Federation in two directions: two Russian military bases will be created in Syria and Russian companies will receive privileges in this country, in connection with which Russia will actively continue to support the Syrian government. The President of the Russian Federation also believes that the final settlement of the situation in Syria should be found within the framework of the Geneva process in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which means holding a constitutional reform and free elections in the country under the auspices of the UN while maintaining the territorial integrity and secular nature of the state.

A huge role in the further strengthening of Russian–Syrian ties should be played by the development of trade and economic ties between the two countries. So, as a result of the visit of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Yu.I. Borisov and Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov to Syria in September 2020, Russia opened a new page in relations with Syria. The economy comes to the fore in these relations. Both Russian guests noted that it would be difficult to establish effective economic cooperation due to Western sanctions, but, as emphasized by Yu.I. Borisov, Moscow and Damascus will try to break the blockade of Syria by joint efforts [14].

The indisputable success of Russian diplomacy is the establishment of cooperation with Turkey and Iran on the Syrian issue. Initially, Turkey took the opposite position to Russia in the Syrian conflict. Ankara supported one of the largest armed groups in Syria, the Syrian Free Army, and only after significant successes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in their conduct of warfare did it cooperate with Moscow (currently, successful joint Russian–Turkish military patrols are being conducted in northern Syria on the demarcation line of the conflicting sides). At the same time, Turkish President R. Erdogan categorically opposes the creation of any Kurdish autonomy in Syria, because the success of the Syrian Kurds could give additional impetus to the struggle of this ethnic minority in Turkey. Therefore, the main goal of Ankara in Syria is the formation of a buffer zone in its north in order to prevent the implementation of the Kurdish project there. This will allow Ankara to break the ties between the Kurds of Syria and Turkey and to ensure the settlement of Syrian refugees, mainly Sunni Arabs, in the territory created in the border strip of the “security zone.”

As for the Iranian leadership, from the very beginning of the Syrian conflict it strongly supported the government of B. Assad. This support includes not only the delivery of weapons and military equipment (WME) to Syria, but also the training of Syrian military personnel, and the exchange of intelligence data between the military departments of both countries, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran carried the main burden in conducting ground operations in Syria. In addition, Tehran coordinates its policy on Syria with Moscow within the framework of the Astana process.

Both Russia and Iran are aware that their emerging military–political rapprochement must be supplemented by economic cooperation. The visit of Iranian President E. Raisi to Moscow in January 2022 was evidence of the readiness of the parties to open a new page in Russian–Iranian relations. In 2021, bilateral trade reached a record 3.3 billion dollars and, according to the Iranian president, Russian–Iranian trade could reach 10 billion dollars in the coming years [15].

Therefore, it is by no means accidental that in September 2021, with the assistance of Russia, at the 20th SCO summit, a decision was made to admit Iran to the membership of the organization. In this regard, many experts express the opinion that in the future Iran will focus more on the eastern direction. First of all, it is a case of changing the accents of Tehran in its geopolitics in the Middle East and the emergence of new facets of cooperation with the countries of the region in the trade and economic sphere; in the field of energy, transport, banking; and in the field of regional security. It is also important that Iran’s permanent membership in the SCO will be a serious protection in the event of military intervention by the United States, because membership in the SCO increases the geopolitical weight of Iran at the expense of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation and China.

At the SCO summit in September 2021, the President of the Russian Federation welcomed the granting of the status of “SCO dialogue partners” to the leading states of the Middle East—Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia [16]. If Moscow pursues a flexible policy and strategy towards these countries, in the future they can form a “belt of Middle Eastern allies” of Russia, provided that it does not repeat its mistakes about the attitude of “old friends,” in particular Iraq, which was previously part of orbit of Soviet influence, and is now under the influence of the United States.

In connection with these circumstances, it would be expedient for Moscow in the near future to clarify certain elements of Russian Middle East policy and strategy. At the same time, the Russian authorities need to be vigilant about Washington’s attempts to drive a wedge into the successful development of Russian relations with the states of the region.

CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN THE REGION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

The PRC’s Middle East policy is guided by the Chinese concept outlined in the document “China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era” published by the PRC State Council Information Office in January 2021. Despite the tremendous economic success of the past 70 years, China remains an emerging economy and its cooperation for development is a form of mutual assistance between developing countries. This interaction with the Middle Eastern countries is carried out within the framework of the One Belt, One Road concept [3].

As for the Chinese strategy of “dual circulation,” it is unlikely that it will affect the implementation of the One Belt, One Road concept in the Middle East. The fact is that this strategy should be considered in the context of China’s global plans to reduce the trade, economic, and technological dependence on Western countries and the global production chains [Yu. Kulintsev, 2021], but it is not technologically dependent on Middle Eastern states, and therefore the “double circulation” is unlikely to affect the nature of trade and economic ties between China and the countries of the region.

Unlike Russia, China prefers not to intervene directly with its military force in existing regional conflicts, which corresponds to its approach to the problems of the Middle East, based on the postulate of a “soft” foreign policy. Thanks to this, China’s influence in the region is growing rapidly in comparison with the United States, whose effectiveness in resolving the Middle East crises is increasingly being questioned by their regional allies. Beijing has established good partnerships with almost all Gulf countries except Bahrain and is the largest foreign investor in the region. Today, the total volume of Chinese investments in the countries of the Middle East is 177 billion dollars, including 70 billion in the economies of the countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council [17]. At the same time, most of the investments are directed to the traditional allies of the United States, many of which are active buyers of Chinese weapons and military equipment. The PRC is also investing heavily in commercial ports that can easily be turned into naval facilities at other strategic locations in the region, including Pakistan’s Gwadar and the Omani port of Duqm in the Strait of Oman. In addition, China considers the Straits of Malacca and Bab el-Mandeb critical to its economic survival, since most of China’s energy imports are delivered through these straits. As Sino–US relations deteriorate, Beijing is looking to increase control over these waterways and reduce the US Navy’s ability to block them. This is the main reason why China is improving its navy, and a Chinese military base has been established in Djibouti [D. Anderlini, 2020].

In addition, since 2010, there has been a positive shift in Israeli–Chinese relations towards cooperation: Israel was allowed to establish its own pavilion at Expo 2010 in Shanghai, then deals between these countries followed, which allowed Chinese companies to implement a number of infrastructure development projects in Israel, including railways to Eilat, Ashdod, Akko, and the development of the port of Ashdod, while increasing the flow of Chinese investment in the Israeli technology sector. As a result, in 2017, the Israeli government approved an agreement to bring 20 000 workers from China to Israel, and the Chinese Shanghai International Port Group won a tender to operate the Haifa port for 25 years. This caused serious concerns in Washington regarding the security of the forces of the 6th Fleet of the US Navy, which is based in this port. At the same time, Tel Aviv rejected Washington’s proposal to conduct a comprehensive inspection of the port of Haifa in connection with the participation of Chinese companies in its expansion [China and the Arab World… 2021].

China is also the largest trading and investment partner of Egypt, the largest country in the Arab world. From January to September 2020, the volume of bilateral trade amounted to 10.2 billion dollars, which is 6.6% more than in 2019. At the same time, Chinese direct investment in Egypt increased by 19%, and the volume of Chinese investment by the Egyptian domestic market exceeded seven billion dollars. In the near future, according to the Egyptian Minister for Investment and International Cooperation, Cairo will receive about 30 billion dollars of new Chinese investment, of which 20 billion dollars will go to the construction of the “New Administrative Capital” in the Chinese industrial zone in the Suez Canal area and for the continuation of the construction of a high-speed railway that will connect this capital with all Egyptian cities. In addition, China completed the construction of the first high-voltage power line in Egypt and a joint Egyptian laboratory with the Chinese Institute of Applied Technology [China and the Arab World… 2021].

Along with the development of cooperation with Israel and Egypt, the Chinese side is interested in cooperation with other countries in the region on the principle of mutual benefit, especially through their participation in the implementation of the One Belt, One Road project. This project will play a significant role in expanding China’s cooperation with the Arab states in the field of infrastructure and in promoting trade and investment, in addition to nuclear energy, space, new energy sources, agriculture, and other areas [18].

There are many other areas connecting China and the Middle East world—a wide network of economic and trade relations, the Suez Canal, other sea routes, etc. At the same time, China is the largest importer of Middle Eastern oil in the world, in connection with which China has increased its investment in oil-producing countries and has become their main trading partner. Added to this is the fact that, as a result of the development of Sino–Arab relations, there has been a significant increase in the number of airlines connecting these countries (their figures exceeded 200 flights per month), carrying more than one million passengers annually, which contributes to the cooperation of Arab countries with China and the influx of Arab tourists to China [19].

In addition, Beijing’s good relations with the ruling regimes of Muslim countries preclude their moral and material support of the Chinese Muslim Uyghur minority. In joint letters to the UN, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates praised Beijing for its position and welcomed the suppression of Islamic separatists in the XUAR by the Chinese authorities [20].

Nevertheless, with all the successes of its policy in the Middle East, China is facing a number of serious problems in this region. Thus, the conflict potential of the Middle East objectively complicates the implementation of Chinese policy there, taking into account the fact that the influence of the “American factor” on events in the region continues to remain significant. And sanctions imposed by the US and the EU on Iran over the nuclear dispute have limited China’s energy policy in the region (even though Iran had previously been China’s third-largest supplier of crude oil). In order to maintain economic relations with the United States and the European Union, China was forced to reduce imports from Iran. In addition, due to ongoing military conflicts in the region, Chinese investments in the Middle East are under constant latent threat. Evidence of this is the ISIS forces operating in the region, which not only threaten Chinese oil tankers and transport channels to destabilize China’s efforts to establish relations between East and West, but also declared the Chinese province of Xinjiang part of their caliphate. These threats from ISIS in Iraq have forced many Chinese enterprises to suspend their business there. Added to this are some non-economic factors, especially the problems of corruption in those Arab countries, which are detrimental to Chinese investors.

The existence of these problems is partly facilitated by Beijing’s Middle East policy, which is based on the principles of non-intervention and neutrality. In this regard, a number of international experts believe that it is expedient for Beijing to change this too “soft” line of behavior in the region, since the situation in the Middle East does not imply such a passive political position and does not fully correspond to the status of the leading world power, which is China. But, despite these problems, cooperation between China and the countries of the Middle East continues to be based on a solid foundation, and China remains the largest consumer of Middle Eastern energy resources, the demand for which continues to grow. Chinese energy companies have experience of participating in energy development projects in the Middle East, especially in the petrochemical sector. In turn, the businessmen of the region are striving to expand their market shares in China. Aware of these interrelations, Beijing actively interacts with the states of the Middle East through traditional methods of cooperation, such as the Sino–Arab States Cooperation Forum. In parallel, it seeks to create alternative international organizations, as happened with the creation of the BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (founded in 2016), in which seven Arab countries participated as founding members.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions can be drawn.

First, the United States is gradually losing its once-dominant military–political positions in the Middle East region. They were forced to abandon violent “regime change.” The American Middle East strategy is currently in a state of gradual transformation, and the United States is increasingly forced to engage in such regional adversaries as the PRC, the Russian Federation, and Iran, while at the same time abandoning plans to “democratize” the Middle East. Due to a combination of reasons, the interest of American business circles in economic cooperation with the countries of the region is also decreasing.

Second, Russia, defending its interests in the Middle East, has firmly taken the place of one of the most significant players in this region, which was lost in the era of the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, Russia’s modern Middle East policy is determined by the understanding that the problems faced by the states of the region pose a serious threat to it. In this regard, Moscow takes an active part in resolving regional crises, thus becoming a strong extra-regional player capable of influencing regional problems not only by force, as in Syria, but also by diplomatic methods. And its economic ties with all significant forces in the region, as well as the growth of confidence among the leaders of the Middle Eastern states in the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin testify to the strengthening of the positive image of Russia in the Middle East. This was also facilitated by the successfully conducted military operation in Syria by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, which significantly increased their military-strategic weight in the world.

Third, China is consistently expanding its influence in the Middle East, using its economy, investments, and diplomacy for this purpose, preferring not to interfere in existing regional conflicts. At the same time, China has serious advantages in the Middle East, acting as a preferred partner for the states of the region, given Beijing’s ability to provide them with loans and develop economic cooperation. Beijing considers the Middle East region as an important component of the implementation of the global One Belt, One Road project, in which China managed to establish good relations with all the Middle Eastern countries, in connection with which many Arab countries consider China not only as a reliable partner, but also as a force capable of balancing the American presence in the Middle East. However, despite China’s huge efforts to expand its presence in the region, in the short term, the Chinese side will not be able to replace the United States fully as a key ally for the Gulf states, which still need an American “security umbrella” that protects them against foreign and internal dangers and threats. In addition, the expansion of the Chinese presence in the region is facing problems associated with unresolved military conflicts here, which negatively affect the national interests of the PRC in the Middle East.

Fourth, despite the existence of major disagreements amouong Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, their constructive interaction could contribute to the solution of a number of serious security problems in the Middle East region [21]. Thus, the United States is a military ally of Saudi Arabia, Russia maintains intensive military–technical ties with Iran, and China is a key partner of these two Gulf countries, on which the security and stability of the zone of this region depends.

As for Chinese–Russian cooperation in the Middle East, the BRICS and SCO platforms can become a promising area for developing contacts between Moscow and Beijing with the countries of the region, which will help China and the Russian Federation to implement joint initiatives in the region. In addition, according to Russian experts, taking into account cooperation along the China–Iran–Russia axis, Moscow and Beijing could define their areas of responsibility both in regards to the restoration of Syria (in September 2021, China expressed its intention to participate in the restoration of this country) and the Middle East as a whole. Another element of Russian–Chinese cooperation could be the connection of the International North–South Transport Corridor, which is being formed along the Russia–Azerbaijan–Iran route with access to India, with the Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative.

It seems that these three great powers—the United States, Russia, and China—could use their traditional ties in the region to strengthen the security of the Middle East.