Employee socio-economic dependency as an antecedent of abusive supervision in Russian business organisations

The purpose of this paper is to identify previously unexamined predictors of abusive supervision (AS) that stem from socio-economic dependency of employees upon their direct supervisors.

Using social exchange theory (SET) as framework, the author conducted empirical analysis that was based on survey data collected among 1,100 Russian white-collar private sector employees.

The results reveal the importance of organisation-level managerial practices which create employees' socio-economic dependency in predicting abusive supervision (AS). Significant positive predictions of AS in Russian business organisations are “accidental” and “zero-option” employment; getting a job through informal social contacts (“blat”); and dependence of wage upon personal relations with a supervisor. In turn, performance-based payment is the strongest factor that hinders AS. Taken together, these factors support one of the key assumptions of SET that control over valued resources creates imbalanced power relations, thus providing the fertile ground to the abuse of power.

Findings show that a transparent, performance-based system of payments, contributes to preventing AS by immediate supervisors. The author also provides arguments for reducing the economic and administrative power of line managers.

This study adds to the understanding of the role of managerial practices, which create socio-economic dependency of employees from managers, in predicting AS in organisations.