Income smoothing behaviour by Asian transportation firms

Managers may “creatively” choose accounting methods in order to smooth income figures. Using a sample of 1,094 transportation firm‐year observations before and throughout the global financial crisis (GFC) period of 2006‐2009 in seven Asian countries, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether managers' smooth reported earnings to meet the benchmark target of last year's earnings figure.

Following previous research (e.g.,Burgstahler and Dichev; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser; Holland and Ramsay; Burgstahler and Eames; Daske, Gebhardt, and McLeay; Gore, Pope, and Singh; Charoenwong and Jiraporn), this study uses an earnings benchmark of sustaining last year's performance as the key indicator of earnings management.

The empirical evidence reveals that corporate managers seem to opportunistically smooth income to beat earnings targets. The results also show that the AuditQuality, EcoCrisis and Size are not explanatory for the smoothing behavior of the above target firms. However, the independent variables EcoCrisis and Size are predictors for the smoothing behavior of the sample firms that engage in income‐increasing earnings management. The coefficient on EcoCrisis is negative and significantly (at p=0.001) related to the earnings management measure, suggesting that during a period of economic stress, transportation firm managers engage in less aggressive income‐increasing discretionary accruals strategy. Furthermore, the findings confirm that large size firms exhibit less aggressive income‐increasing earnings management behavior. Specifically, the coefficient on Size is negative and moderately significant (p=0.056) associated with earnings management measure.

This study strongly supports the political costs hypothesis which argues that larger firms are subject to more public scrutiny and political actions therein exhibiting less aggressive income‐increasing earnings management behavior. The authors further note a “big bath” phenomenon during the GFC period suggesting that corporate managers manipulate their reported earnings downward to make poor results even worse in the current financial period, artificially enhancing future year's earnings.