Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), which is immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is the most promising solution to the security issues in practical quantum key distribution systems. Although several experimental demonstrations of MDI-QKD have been reported, they all make one crucial but not yet verified assumption, that is, there are no flaws in state preparation. Such an assumption is unrealistic and security loopholes remain in the source. Here we present a MDI-QKD experiment with the modulation error taken into consideration. By applying the loss-tolerant security proof by Tamaki et al. [Phys. Rev. A 90, 052314 (2014)], we distribute secure keys over fiber links up to 40 km with imperfect sources, which would not have been possible under previous security proofs. By simultaneously closing loopholes at the detectors and a critical loophole—modulation error in the source, our work shows the feasibility of secure QKD with practical imperfect devices.

• Received 17 August 2015
• Revised 4 January 2016

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.93.042308