Higher-security thresholds for quantum key distribution by improved analysis of dark counts

J.-C. Boileau, J. Batuwantudawe, and R. Laflamme

Phys. Rev. A 72, 032321 – Published 16 September 2005

Abstract

We discuss the potential of quantum key distribution (QKD) for long-distance communication by proposing an analysis of the errors caused by dark counts. We give sufficient conditions for a considerable improvement of the key generation rates and the security thresholds of well-known QKD protocols such as the Bennett-Brassard 1984, Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000, and six-state protocols. This analysis is applicable to other QKD protocols like the Bennett 1992 protocol. We examine two scenarios: a sender using a perfect single-photon source and a sender using a Poissonian source.

Received 28 June 2005

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.72.032321

Authors & Affiliations

J.-C. Boileau^1,2, J. Batuwantudawe¹, and R. Laflamme^1,2

¹Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada
²Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, 35 King Street North, Waterloo, Ontario N2J 2W9, Canada

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Vol. 72, Iss. 3 — September 2005

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