Abstract
The interaction among a firm’s choices of output, technology, and monitoring intensity is studied in a general equilibrium model. Firms engage in oligopolistic competition, and unemployment is a result of the existence of efficiency wages. The following results are derived analytically. First, an increase in the cost of exerting effort leads a firm to choose a more advanced technology and a lower level of monitoring intensity. Second, an increase in the discount rate does not change a firm’s choices of technology and monitoring intensity. Third, an increase in the elasticity of substitution among goods leads a firm to choose higher levels of monitoring intensity and technology. In a model in which the level of monitoring is exogenously given, there is a negative relationship between the wage rate and the monitoring intensity. In this model with endogenously chosen monitoring intensity, the wage rate and the monitoring intensity can move either in the same direction or in opposite directions.
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Notes
The importance of oligopoly in a modern society is illustrated in Chandler (1990). The Second Industrial Revolution occurred in the United States of America near the end of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century. During that period, with increasing returns in production, management, and distribution, important industries such as the steel industry began to be dominated by oligopolistic firms.
To emphasize the wage rate is the equilibrium value, we may add an asterisk mark over this variable. That is, we may use \(w^{*}\) instead of \(w\) in Eq. (8).
To make sure that the second-order condition for the optimal choice of technology is satisfied, we also assume that \(f^{\prime \prime } \left( n \right) \ge 0\) and \(\beta^{\prime \prime } \left( n \right) \ge 0\).
When a firm chooses its monitoring intensity and technology, this firm does not take strategic impact on other firms’ output into consideration. This is consistent with the “open loop” approach in the R&D literature when firms engage in oligopolistic competition, as studied in Vives (2008).
The derivation of Eqs. (19a)–(19c) is as follows. First, from Eq. (16), \(r = x\left( {1 - \beta w} \right)/\left( {f + \frac{\theta }{2}q^{2} } \right)\). Plugging this value of \(r\) into Eq. (16) yields \(\beta e\left( {\frac{b}{u} + \rho } \right)\left( {f + \frac{\theta }{2}q^{2} } \right) - \theta \left( {1 - \beta w} \right)q^{3} = 0\). Plugging Eq. (18) into this equation yields Eq. (19a). Second, plugging \(r = x\left( {1 - \beta w} \right)/\left( {f + \frac{\theta }{2}q^{2} } \right)\) into Eq. (10) yields \(f^{\prime } \left( {1 - \beta w} \right) + \beta^{\prime } w\left( {f + \frac{\theta }{2}q^{2} } \right) = 0\). Plugging the value of \(w\) from Eq. (18) into this equation yields Eq. (19b). Third, plugging the value of \(w\) from \(f + \frac{\theta }{2}q^{2} = \left( {1 - \beta w} \right)\sigma K\) into Eq. (17) yields \(\frac{1}{\beta } - e - \frac{e}{q}\left( {\frac{b}{u} + \rho } \right) - \frac{{f + \frac{\theta }{2}q^{2} }}{\beta \sigma K} = 0\). Plugging Eq. (18) into this equation yields Eq. (19c).
The impact of a change in the exogenous job separation rate is like that from a change in the discount rate and is not presented here.
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I thank Diego Nocetti, David Selover, Lei Wen, and two anonymous reviewers for their very valuable suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Appendix
Appendix
The system of Eqs. (8)–(16) defining the steady state can be reduced alternatively into the following system of three equations defining three variables \(w\), \(n\), and \(q\) as functions of exogenous parameters:
The derivation of Eqs. (21)–(23) is as follows. First, Eq. (21) is the same as Eq. (18). Second, Eq. (22) is derived by plugging the value of \(r\) from Eqs. (16) and (18) into Eq. (10). Third, Eq. (23) is derived by plugging the value of \(u\) from Eq. (17) into Eq. (19a).
Partial differentiation of Eqs. (21)–(23) yields
Let \(\Delta_{\varOmega }\) denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (24). For stability, it is assumed that \(\Delta_{\varOmega } < 0\). Comparative statics results from (24) are the same as those from (20). For example, applying Cramer’s rule to (24) yields \(\frac{{{\text{d}}w}}{{{\text{d}}e}} = \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial n}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial e}/\Delta_{\varOmega } > 0\). This result is the same as that in Proposition 4. However, the system (24) can be used to derive the following additional results. Those results are not available from (20).
Partial differentiation of (21) and (23) reveals that \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial K} - \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial K}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial q} = \frac{2qf\theta }{K} > 0\). With \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial n} < 0\) and \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial K}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial n} > 0\), it is clear that \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial n}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial K} - \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial K}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial n}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial q} - \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial K}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial n} < 0\). Partial differentiation of Eqs. (21) and (23) reveals that \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial \sigma } - \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial \sigma }\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial q} = \frac{2fq\theta }{\sigma } > 0\). With \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial n} < 0\) and \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial \sigma }\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial n} > 0\), \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial n}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial \sigma } - \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial \sigma }\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial n}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial q} - \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{2} }}{\partial \sigma }\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial n} < 0\). Applying Cramer’s rule to (24) yields
Partial differentiation of Eqs. (21) and (23) reveals that \(\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial q}\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial \theta } - \frac{{\partial \varOmega_{1} }}{\partial \theta }\frac{{\partial \varOmega_{3} }}{\partial q} = \theta q^{3} - \theta q^{3} = 0\). Applying Cramer’s rule to (24) yields
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Zhou, H. Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice in a Model of Unemployment. Eastern Econ J 46, 504–520 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41302-019-00144-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41302-019-00144-5