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Sexual Objectification: From Kant to Contemporary Feminism

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Abstract

Sexual objectification is a common theme in contemporary feminist theory. It has been associated with the work of the anti-pornography feminists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, and, more recently, with the work of Martha Nussbaum. Interestingly, these feminists' views on objectification have their foundations in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Fully comprehending contemporary discussions of sexuality and objectification, therefore, requires a close and careful analysis of Kant's own theory of objectification. In this paper, I provide such an analysis. I explain what is involved, for Kant, in the process of objectification, what it really means for a person to be an object (what Kant calls an ‘object of appetite’), and finally deal with his reasons for thinking that marriage can provide the solution to the problem of sexual objectification. I then proceed to some contemporary feminist discussions on sexual objectification, showing how influential Kant's ideas have been for contemporary feminist thinkers MacKinnon, Dworkin, and Nussbaum. My analysis of these feminists' work focuses on the striking similarities, as well as the important differences, that exist between their views and Kant's views on what objectification is, how it is caused, and how it can be eliminated.

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Figure 1

Notes

  1. This paper focuses on sexual objectification occurring within heterosexual relationships. Objectification, however, the lowering of person to the level of an object, is not, for Kant, the only moral danger involved in the exercise of sexuality. He is also worried that ‘sexuality… exposes mankind to the danger of equality with the beasts’ (Kant, 1963, 164). Here, Kant is concerned that sex will engage the human predisposition to animality, which John Rawls describes as a, ‘Physical and ‘purely mechanical’ self-love by which [Kant] means that it does not require the exercise of reason and is generally guided by instinct and by acquired tendencies and habits' (Rawls, 2000, 292).

  2. Kant uses the German terms ‘mensch’ (‘human being’) and ‘person’ (‘person’) interchangeably when talking about sexual desire in the Lectures on Ethics (Kant, 1963, 162–168). In this paper, I also use these two terms in an interchangeable manner.

  3. Since women, according to Kant, generally have fewer rights and less power than men within sexual relationships outside monogamous marriage, they are the most likely victims of objectification. Even though, in theory, for Kant, a woman can objectify a man, this does not very often happen in practice, as his discussions of concubinage and polygamous marriage reveal. I have decided, therefore, to use the female pronoun for the ‘loved person’ (the objectified) and the male pronoun for the ‘lover’ (the objectifier) throughout this paper.

  4. ‘Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a means by any man (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not men and yet can be used, and so over all things’ (Kant, 1996, 209).

  5. Monogamous marriage is, for Kant, the only exception to this claim. As we will see in the following section, Kant thought that the married spouses do indeed gain rights of disposal over each other's persons.

  6. In 1983, MacKinnon and Dworkin proposed an anti-pornography ordinance. This did not in fact seek to impose criminal prohibitions on pornography; that is, it did not seek to make the production, sale, or consumption of pornography a criminal offence. These feminists' proposal, rather, was a civil rights legislation allowing women who were harmed by pornography (either in the making of pornography or as a result of its consumption) to sue for a ban on sexually explicit material demonstrated to be harmful, as well as win damages for provable harm caused by such material.

  7. The clients in prostitution do not, for Kant, get objectified. In blindly surrendering to their sexual inclinations, however, their humanity is threatened by exposing themselves to what Kant calls ‘the danger of equality with the beasts’ (Kant, 1963, 164).

  8. Kant's views are very similar when it comes to polygamous marriage. He writes about a man who has two wives: ‘In such a case each wife would have but half a man, although she would be giving herself wholly and ought in consequence to be entitled to the whole man’ (Kant, 1963, 167).

  9. The man in concubinage manages to save himself from objectification (the idea seems to be, albeit odd, that he does not surrender his person completely to any woman, so no woman can possess his person completely, so he does not lose his person). However, he is morally harmed as well. In exercising his sexuality within this morally problematic context, he lowers himself to the level of animals. It is the danger of animality, therefore, that threatens his humanity.

  10. This is a quite striking view; in order for the spouses to be able to own each other's persons, it is necessary not only that they own each other's bodies, but also that they use each other's bodies sexually.

  11. As MacKinnon explains: ‘Men treat women as who they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power over women means that the way men see women defines who women can be. Pornography is that way. Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation, or symbol either. It is sexual reality’ (MacKinnon, 1987, 172–173).

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Acknowledgements

My special thanks to Jennifer Saul and Leif Wenar for their invaluable help throughout the writing of this article. I am also very grateful to Barbara Herman and Mari Mikkola for their suggestions on an earlier draft of the article. Furthermore, I have very much benefited from discussions with audiences at the universities of Sheffield and M.I.T. I would also like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees of Contemporary Political Theory for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Papadaki, E. Sexual Objectification: From Kant to Contemporary Feminism. Contemp Polit Theory 6, 330–348 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300282

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